A Political Economy of Inclusive Agricultural Intensification

Zambia Country Report

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"Agricultural intensification has been neither inevitable nor continuous in African farming systems. In some areas, intensification was halted or reversed by changing environmental or political and economic conditions; in others, it has occurred not as an adaptive response to population growth or commercialisation, but in the face of growing labour shortages and declining commercial activity. Such cases underscore the importance of studying farming as a dynamic social process. As farmers contend with social as well as environmental conditions, changes occur not only in what is produced and how much, but also in when work is done and by whom. Thus changes in cropping patterns and methods of cultivation are influenced by social factors which govern the timing as well as the amounts of labour devoted to farming, as well as the control of effort and output. Variations in the pace and/or direction of agricultural intensification are occasioned not only by exogenous events, such as war and peace, drought or flood, but also by changes in the production dynamics of particular crops” (Berry 1993: 189)
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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACMP - Agricultural Credit Management Programme
ACs - Area Committees
AFC - African Finance Company
AMB - Agricultural Marketing Bill
ARMS - African Rural Marketing Scheme
ASIP - Agricultural Sector Investment Programme
COZ - Credit Organisation of Zambia
CSOs – Civil Society Organizations
DFID - Department for International Development
DOPE - Development Organisation for People’s Empowerment
FAO – Food and Agriculture Organisation
FHHs – Female Headed Households
FRA - Food Reserve Agency
GMB - Grain Marketing Board
GRZ – Government of the Republic of Zambia
GTAZ - Grain Traders Association
HRW – Human Rights Watch
IAPRI – Indaba Agricultural Policy Research Institute
IFAD - International Fund for Agricultural Development
LaSAIs - Large scale agricultural investments
LUCSUS – Lund University Centre for Sustainability Studies
MAF – Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
MAZ - Millers Association of Zambia ( 
MCRF - Market Credit Revolving Fund
MHH – Male Headed Households
MMD - Movement for Multi-party Democracy
MSC - Most Significant Change
NAMBOARD - National Marketing Board
NDP - National Development Plan
NGOs – Non-Governmental Organisations
NYRC - Ndola Youth Resource Centre
PF - Patriotic Front
PMRC – Policy Monitoring and Research Centre
PPP – Public Private Partnership
RPOs - Rural Producer Organisations
SACAU – Southern African Confederation of Agricultural Unions
SAIRLA – Sustainable Agricultural Intensification Research and Learning in Africa
SAPs - Structural Adjustment Programmes
UNIP – United Nations Independent Party
ZADB - Zambia Agricultural Development Bank
ZLA - Zambia Land Alliance
ZNFU - Zambian National Farmers Union
ZSC - Zambian Sugar Company
Executive Summary

This report presents a brief political economy of agriculture in Zambia, with a specific focus on the concept of inclusive and sustainable intensification, and is undertaken as a background working paper for Afrin IV/Papaya- Equity and Institutions in Sustainable African intensification. The Afrin IV/Papaya project frames equity as an exploration of the experience of the identity categories of women and youth. This report does consider these groups, but we argue that to restrict an analysis of power and institutions to these groups is mistaken, given the critical dimension that a class analysis continues to play in agricultural dynamics. In this paper we do not engage with what defines 'sustainable African intensification’ but rather trace the dynamics of agriculture in Zambia, in order to assess the power and politics at play in shaping agricultural outcomes.

Chapter 1 sets out an analysis of the key actors, structural dynamics and outcomes in Zambian agriculture from the pre-colonial to the present.

It is necessary to note that pre-colonial customary systems of land tenure and production were not automatically patriarchal, as they are sometimes characterised. Colonial policy sought to envelope and manage the pre-existing systems, and in doing so also imposed patriarchal and individualised legal frameworks imported from Europe. Hence, multiple systems of land access, allocation, and rights exist in a complex duality that continues to shape agricultural outcomes. The history of Zambia shows a differentiated pattern of agriculture, with the development of large commercial estates producing for export, alongside small-scale farmers cultivating food crops. It is very difficult to generalise patterns of agricultural transformation in Zambia. A mixture of intensification, extension and sometimes general agricultural decline further adds to the challenges of generalisation. Central to this section is examination of the structures that link macro forces to the local dynamics and governing processes therein. Copper mining and production until the early 90s was the backbone of the Zambian economy. Known as a sparsely populated country in Southern Africa, the country sought to increase the productivity of smallholder and commercial agriculture after the copper mining industry suffered decline.

Post 2007, there is a clear and growing interest by donors in agriculture, and particularly in encouraging foreign investment, favouring large-scale outgrower schemes. Donor interventions and NGOs significantly influence aspects of government policy, and in doing so create policies that are contradictory, and often unimplemented in practice by institutions without adequate capacity. Sustainability of intensification is given some attention in policy- with some focus on Conservation Agriculture, but this is not a consistent focus.

At the present time, a growing middle class and elite is increasingly interested in agriculture and is rapidly acquiring land, but agriculture remains a risky and uncertain business. Inequality is growing, and this is the most critical concern for inclusion. The Zambian economy has few other sources of employment beyond agriculture, so the
poorest may be most at risk of exploitation in relation to losing access to land, and having their labour exploited.

Chapter 2 explores the formal and informal ‘rules of the game’. A political economy analysis that only considers the policies that are described in interviews with elites, or in donor funded documents is inevitably incomplete. In Zambia, the gap between policy on paper and implementation is vast: to the extent that policy often exists as a narrative ‘collective fantasy’ concocted by the mutual interests of donors, civil servants and political elites. Local government and institutions charged with policy implementation are ill-equipped to do so, lacking human capacity, resources and authority. Resource allocation remain heavily centralised despite an advanced policy of decentralisation.

Where agricultural intervention does exist, then elite capture at all levels, is a frequent issue, as is illustrated in the example of the Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP). Traditional Authorities and resource allocation committees are frequent sites of elite capture and potential exploitation. Elite capture may have a gender dimension but requires explicit consideration of class. This also applies fundamentally to land policy, where land titling and formalisation may have made it easier for the poorest farmers to be dispossessed of land. A poorer man is very much more disadvantaged than a wealthier woman in this regard.

One potential way to address this gap between policy and practice is to work with the reality of current politics and institutional capacity, as suggested in a problem-driven iterative adaptation approach (See Andrews et al 2013).

Chapter 3 considers incentives and interactions in relation to agricultural dynamics in Zambia. To a substantial extent, an analysis of these reinforces the conclusions of chapter 2. Policy frameworks are dominated by an aid-driven donor discourse, except for the politically important FISP. State investment in agriculture, beyond FISP, remains limited. Private finance is often unaffordable to the small farmer and outgrower schemes have disappointed many of those involved, and in some cases decreased local food security. Elite and commercial interests are favoured in legal and investment frameworks and in the everyday business of institutions. Markets remain exploitative, hard to access, and unreliable for the small farmer. Exploitation and dispossession of resources are the dominant trends.

In conclusion, we assert that agriculture is getting less inclusive in Zambia, but this exclusion is heavily class-based with complexities of age, gender and ethnicity being played out in specific contexts. Engaging with the politics and impacts of FISP and tackling the gap between policy and practice will be essential elements of attempting to address counteract current trends.
About Afrint IV/Papaya

Afrint IV/Papaya - Political economy of inclusive agricultural intensification

Afrint IV/Papaya – Equity and Institutions in Sustainable African Intensification is a research project funded by DFID through Wyg and Greenwich University and implemented by the Department of Human Geography at Lund University in cooperation with the University of Malawi, Sokoine University of Agriculture, the University of Zambia and LUCSUS. The aim of the project is to analyze patterns of smallholder intensification in Zambia, Tanzania and Malawi from a sustainability perspective with a particular attention to: (a) gender and youth; and (b) the ways existing rural institutions could be enabled and incentivized to improve equity given prevailing policies, norms and structures.

The project is comprised of four research questions:

Research Question 1 – To what extent has intensification of smallholder agriculture in Zambia, Malawi and Tanzania 2002-2013 led to soil degradation and poor land management?

Research Question 2 – To what extent and how is the relationship between intensification and soil degradation/land management mediated by gender and age?

Research Question 3 – To what extent and how has intensification reconfigured intra-household relations in terms of gender and age?

Research Question 4 – What is the role of local institutions in creating sustainable intensification? How can these roles be improved to increase equity?

This work stream sets out to answer question 4.

Afrint IV/Papaya is an integral part of SAIRLA – Sustainable Agricultural Intensification Research and Learning in Africa. An initiative comprised of six research projects as well as national and regional learning alliances aimed at providing a forum for mutual learning and for increasing joint policy influence. For more information about Afrint IV/Papaya see www.agriAfrint IV/Papaya.com
INTRODUCTION

Research Question 4 – What is the role of local institutions in creating sustainable intensification? How can these roles be improved to increase equity?

The Afrin IV/Papaya research focuses on the concept of sustainable intensification of agriculture. This refers to increasing the intensity of agricultural production on existing land holdings, rather than the extensive cultivation of new land areas. As populations increase, this extends pressure on land holdings and therefore necessitates the intensification of production. For this to be sustainable, and ultimately for it to play a role in agricultural transformation, then intensification also needs to be inclusive.

It is necessary to define what is meant by ‘inclusive’ and equitable. Inclusivity should have a broad and disaggregated analytical framework, that incorporates the societal differentiations, e.g. of ethnicity, gender, class, age and disability and so on. In this research, limitations of time and resource limit us to consider gender (in this case referring not to the relations of men and women, but only to women) and youth. Youth will be defined according to the conventions adopted in each country.

A political economy analysis attempts to analyse the political, economic, social and institutional dimensions of a particular context. In relation to agricultural transformation, and therefore intensification, it is necessary to understand the evolution of agriculture policy, practice and outcome. Equitable agricultural intensification will require favourable markets, land access, inputs access, knowledge and capacity, appropriate social relations amongst others. Agricultural policy and agricultural support institutions can play a key role in shaping and driving how agricultural evolves and ultimately transforms. At the macro level, national governments are responsible for agricultural policy, but are influenced through dialogue and support of development partners.

At a more meso-level, sub-national agricultural institutions and actors (including extension services, farmer organisations, traders, investors in contract farming, input suppliers and local authorities who control land tenure systems) are some of the most important mediators that determine the extent to which agricultural policies contribute to equity in ongoing intensification processes. At the micro level, we need to understand how policies are implemented and how farmers experience agricultural support. We also need to understand where customary arrangements e.g. on water and land access, or social norms also operates alongside more formalised institutions.

The incentives, opportunities and obstacles for local actors in promoting (or discouraging) equity are related to both the political economy of local development and a range of often conflicting national policies and programmes. Institutional change processes may lead to either inclusionary or exclusionary tendencies. National-level policies impinging on local institutions and their role in sustainable intensification include not just agricultural policies, but also climate, employment and other relevant policies. They also include issues of market regulation and support.
This report is an agricultural intensification political-economy influenced analysis. It focuses on how multi-level actors shape economic transformation and poverty reduction, paying attention to state-business-donor relations. We specifically consider relationships between elites and wider citizens particularly how the former groups (e.g. through patronage or collective interests) compete for and use resources, rents and power (Prowse 2012). Does agricultural intensification induce changes between elite groups and citizens? Do productivity gains influence competition for and use of resources, rents and power? How do changes in competition between and among elite groups associated with agricultural intensification shape inclusion/exclusion of women and youth?

It employs a three-lens approach looking at:

(a) Mapping the organisational actors (who does what?)
(b) the formal and informal rules of the game in which they operate (how are things supposed to work and how do they work in practice);
(c) the differing incentives and interactions among actors (what are the dynamics of the actors working on agriculture);

The political economy analysis will thus provide the basis for an informed and pragmatic dialogue with decision makers and civil society based on an in-depth understanding of who the decision makers are and what spaces exist for processes that address potential policy conflicts and channel attention to the equity implications of investments in agricultural intensification. These will be integral to Aprint IV/Papaya’s engagement in SAIRLA’s National Learning Alliances.
METHODOLOGY

Political economy analysis entails multiple methods of data collection, to triangulate a number of perspectives, and to map particular contexts. Political economy aims to set out how a current situation comes to be as it is. It therefore requires understanding of how change happened, who influenced it and what outcomes has it led to. The nature of institutions and how they shape change is particularly key to this. For this review, the focus is on the agricultural inclusion for women and youth.

This report draws on several sources of data:

1. A literature review concerning the political economy of agriculture, with a focus on the nature of institutions and evidence on the dynamics of inclusion.

2. National level interviews with key stakeholders from Central Government, NGOs, Academics and other civil society actors. We draw on interviews conducted by Simon Manda for PhD fieldwork in 2016, and by Anna Mdee in January 2018.

3. Afrint IV/Papaya- phase 1 District outcome mapping workshops exercise to obtain an overview of how extension services, farmer organisations, traders, investors in contract farming, input suppliers and local authorities who control land tenure systems are engaging with gender and youth.

4. District level interviews with stakeholders identified through the outcome mapping workshops. This aspect of the research is combined with in-depth interviews with civil society actors advocating for greater equity using a Most Significant Change (MSC) method to explore how to best identify entry points for effective influence. In this case we draw on the PhD fieldwork of Chrispin Matenga and Simon Manda, both of the University of Zambia. All interviewees are anonymised.

It is important to recognise the limitations for the timeframe for this study. The period of fieldwork in January 2018 was limited to seven days. This is very short for an in-depth political economy analysis.

Narrative and thematic analysis is used across the data sets to produce a political economy analysis as set out in the three-lens approach outlined above.

AFRINT IV/PAPAYA PROJECT SITE IN ZAMBIA

MKUSHI DISTRICT

Mkushi is known as the farming district and agricultural belt of Zambia and has been referred to as the ‘showpiece of agricultural development’ by ex-President Rupiah Banda. There is a mix of small, medium and large- scale farmers, thus the use of technology and inputs also remain mixed (Figure 2). The district is also known to have
a diversified and growing local economy. Maize production is high and data reports that the population of small-scale farmers growing maize in the district is continually increasing over the years. Farmers either grow one of the following crops or rear livestock; cassava, beans, sweet potatoes, sorghum, finger millet and tomatoes. There is also the presence of large scale companies and private owners who form the Mkushi Farm Block; a contiguous area known as a commercial farming model, particularly used in soybean production and processing. According to Rural Agricultural Livelihood Survey, 100% of households involved in commercial farming in the district have access to land and the average household land size is 7 hectares (IAPRI,2015; Matenga and Hichaambwa, 2017). Due to large scale production and employment opportunities on the Mkushi Farm Block, Matenga and Hichaambawa (2017) suggest that households that have members employed on the farm block have smaller land holdings than those who do not.

The Conservation Farming Unit (works in the district to ensure higher yields and lower labour demand among Mkushi small-scale farms), Zambian National Farmers Union (advocating for smallholder farmers at both the district and national level), Development Aid from People to People (partners with organisation like Konkola Copper Mines) to implement poverty reduction strategies among vulnerable women, youth and households through livelihood and economic interventions) are examples of state/non state actors working towards agricultural transformation in the district. However, some NGOs argued that Mkushi “has now become a bad example of how agribusiness interfaces with local development” as corroborated by Manda et al. (2017).
This section explores the evolution of agricultural policy, practices and outcomes in Zambia. Inclusionary dynamics among women and youth demands that we explore wider dynamics of structural change in the Zambian agriculture. It is very difficult to generalise patterns of agricultural transformation in Zambia. A mixture of intensification, extension and sometimes general agricultural decline further adds to the challenges of generalisation. Central to this section is examination of the structures that link macro forces to the local dynamics and governing processes therein. Copper mining and production until the early 1990s was the backbone of the Zambian economy. Known as a sparsely populated country in Southern Africa, the country sought to increase the productivity of smallholder and commercial agriculture after the copper mining industry suffered decline.

In what follows, we situate dynamics of structural change in historical context, contouing five republics – political regimes: the United National Independence Party’s (UNIP) first (1964-1972, characterised by multi-party politics), and second (1972-1991, characterised by one party politics); Movement for Multi-party Democracy’s (MMD) third (1991-2001) as era of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) and fourth (2001-2011), and Patriotic Front’s (PF) fifth (2011-2016) regime. For brevity’s sake, this section considers the period 1964-1991 as the first republic; 1991-2001 as second, and 2001-2016 as third.

** Colonial era**

Shadows of past and colonial policies can still be seen in the present-day politics and policies of Zambian agriculture. For example, each province in the country differs in agriculture practice, intensification and diversification due to the differences in history, politics and socioeconomic issues (Gumbo et al, 2016). In some areas, and acquired from farmers was used to create reserves, in which farmers were later banned from hunting. As land became limited, these poor farmers were forced to cultivate the same land year after year causing a decline in soil fertility. Farmers adopted livestock rearing as a diversification venture yet an increase in tsetse fly population due to the hunting ban in the reserves/increase in wildlife population led to the declining of the population of the livestock (Gumbo et al 2016).

The history and expansion of mining in Zambia directly relates to policy and structural dynamics in Zambian agriculture. The development of mining since the late 1920s captured rural migrant labour towards the Copperbelt in reaction to jobs and prospects of an urban life (Scott 1995; Ferguson 1999). As elsewhere in SSA, colonial and post-colonial eras advanced agricultural modernisation through plantation and farm-blocks although this was less wide-spread than in other places (Scott 1995). However, crucially for our analysis is how European settlement altered customary land
arrangements – in which use rights for women and youths were implicated as members of chiefdoms (Mujenja and Wonani 2012; Adams 2003). Whilst designating land in communal areas (Native reserves), the system introduced an individualised and patriarchal approach to land access and utilisation administered as freehold for Europeans (Crown land).

However, Zambian society was left at the end of the colonial era as inherently biased towards rural-urban migration:

"the subsistence sector is so large, villages are so underdeveloped, and rural-urban money incomes so far apart, that it will be many years before social and economic conditions in agriculture can be such as to slacken the rate of migration to towns, even if education were effective in making rural life more attractive." UN report on Zambia, 1964 (cited in Simson, 1985:13)

During these times, the goal of colonial leaders was to provide cheap sources of food for settlers and copper miners. Vegetable seeds, cotton farming and Irish potatoes were introduced to “enhance” the livelihoods of the smallholder farmer (Tembo 2011). By diversifying and improving livelihoods of farmers, it was expected that they would be able to pay the huge taxes that were levied upon them, and moreover that they would not compete with white farmers. Zambian farmers ended up receiving low prices from the controlled marketing boards for their maize, with the price differences felt most by poor and “unimproved” farmers (Simson 1985). The taxation deducted was known to be used for price stabilization and erosion control in the reserves. This inequality introduced by colonial regime still exists in present day Zambia agriculture. As productivity for introduced crops failed, the maize demand by the large urban class increased therefore creating a demand for commercial agriculture (for maize only).

**First Republic 1964-1991**

Zambia inherited a discriminatory colonial policy that privileged minority European producers whilst systematically precluding majority local producers from remunerative agricultural markets (Chipungu 1988). To achieve lower producer prices, two marketing entities: the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) (predominantly European) that offered higher prices and the African Rural Marketing Scheme (ARMS) (for the African producers) that offered discounted prices were created. Impetus for wage labour principally in the mining sector as opposed to agricultural engagement stemmed from lower grain prices combined with other targeted taxes (Robinson et al. 2007; Zulu et al. 2015). This illustrates the urban-biased policy thrust that prioritised maize production reflective of emerging demand growth among politically active urbanites. For our analysis, we should recognise the gendered impacts of the economy. With labour in the mines being focused on men, then agricultural production for the smallholder becomes increasingly focused on women and youth.

Whereas discriminatory market policies were blamed for huge disparities both within rural African farming sphere and between rural and urban centres, the immediate post-independence policies (e.g. First National Development Plan) proved inadequate in addressing these imbalances. Driven by the need for wide-spread development and desire to rehabilitate black farmers (Robinson et al. 2007) and anchored on the maize
imperative for food self-sufficiency, the government formed the National Marketing Board – an amalgamation of GMB and ARMs – in 1969 and the Credit Organisation of Zambia (COZ) (vehicle for subsidies) in 1966 (Kydd 1986). Farmer cooperatives privileged with subsidised fertiliser and seed mainly on credit consequently proliferated, which owing to diverse factors (e.g. inadequate institutional capacity and high default rates) led to COZ’s indebtedness and failure (MDPNG 1972). Whilst these productivity schemes were made possible by buoyant copper prices, the state’s role in the economy was fundamentally transformed in the late 1960s.

Government’s rapid nationalisation in late 1960s saw it acquire 80% of the economy which saw the establishment of agriculture marketing boards. Defined by outright populism and through the National Marketing Board (NAMBOARD), pan-territorial pricing for maize was introduced shaped by series of credit schemes (Zulu et al. 2015). Donor and government effort combined to create a seed industry in Zambia and later the establishment of ZAMSEED in 1981 – a parastatal seed company – which once again entrenched the maize imperative (Howard and Mungoma 1996). Investments in seed, credit schemes and infrastructure developments later prove economically costly for the country gobbling about 15% of national budget in the late 1980s highlighting a crucial missing sustainability focus (Zulu et al. 2015). Meanwhile the African Finance Company (AFC) was established in 1974 replacing the COZ with a function of providing loans to farmers and – due to high default rates – leading to the formation of the Zambia Agricultural Development Bank (ZADB) in 1979. In view of poor recovery rates under AFC, LIMA Bank was formed in 1986 as an amalgamation of AFC and ZADB still with agricultural credit at its core but with an agricultural modernisation imperative. Whilst the Bank provided credit to three farmer categories (small, medium and large scale), its focus continued to be small-scale – shaped by maize production incentives. Once again, the Bank’s indebtedness led to its closure in the 1990s highlighting the challenges of project design.

Reliance on the copper industry for most of these credit schemes and plummeting copper prices in the mid-1970s sent troubling ripples in the economy raising the need to rethink this development path. Despite a diversification policy rhetoric, Zambia’s economy remained largely undiversified characterised by decreasing share of agriculture to the economy – 1.5% in the mid-1970s and zero in the early 1980s (Kydd 1986). Despite this economic decline, little was done to adjust the economy towards diversification and sustainability raising serious balance of payment deficits and later, with heavy borrowing, becoming indebted to the International Financial Institutions. Efforts to liberalise the economy in the mid-1980s (through donors) proved insufficient and instead sparked food riots forcing the government to renege on reforms and re-introduce agricultural subsidies. The consequence of this was donor withdrawal of debt payment support leading to a free-fall of the economy and sparking further social tension and riots in the early 1990s. These food and commodity supply challenges

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4 The Government further operated state farms and parastatals companies (Bwalya 1984).
arguably shaped the demise of the UNIP regime and birth of multi-party politics and economic liberalisation in the early 1990s (Robinson et al. 2007). Whilst the policy in this period emphasised productivity schemes anchored on smallholders, the subsequent regime moved towards expanding private sector participation and widened commercialisation in agriculture. More crucially and in relation to our analysis, this is reflective of a changing role and position of women and youths in the so called ‘new agro-vision.’

Whilst outcomes for this era are diverse and debated (Scott 1995), suffice to mention that post-independence agricultural performance and transformation remained modest at best, leading to limited structural changes across the sector (Scott 1995). As opposed to structural transformation, the sector witnessed widespread public expenditure as subsidies which at a critical level served a populist agenda. One consequence was that smallholder production always responded to government policy rather than market dynamics in Zambia. For instance, the 1990s saw a decline in maize production and yields in response to state withdrawal only to regain momentum in post 2000 with renewed public spending on farmer subsidies (Figure 1).

Figure 1.1: Maize production and yields in Zambia (1964-2014) (Source: Author, FAOSTAT 2016).

Meanwhile tight land control – through the 1975 land reforms that vested all land in the Presidency whilst restricting land market development – meant this period saw little rent-seeking and elite accumulation apart from within existing commercial ventures (see Scott 1995). Thus, the centrality of state institutions in this period adds to this perspective.


This era shifts from the highly interventionist policy characterised by a state-led investment approach to a more forceful drive towards economic liberalisation. Whilst this was punctuated largely by failure to boost private sector participation in agriculture, once direct result was the re-emergence of state involvement. The agricultural policy in this period was greatly shaped by the SAPs which emphasised private sector growth and removal of public monopolies compelling the government to remove input subsidies (Rakner 2003). The government announced total decontrol
of maize producer prices (1994/1995) and introduced Value Added Tax (VAT) with an exemption on maize and maize meal illustrating once more government continued preferential treatment of the commodity. The maize marketing was equally changed by repealing the National Agricultural Marketing Act 1989 and replacing it with the Food Reserve Act 1995 which formed the Food Reserve Agency (FRA) whose mandate was to hold buffer stocks.

However, a compounding factor was that government withdrew from the maize market (1993) but failed to immediately stimulate private sector response. Some of this relates to escalating interest rates, further inspiring the government to continue its involvement in fertiliser importation and marketing (Saasa 1996). The argument was that the private sector was embryonic, undercapitalised and lacked capacity to supply inputs to rural areas and that the farmers themselves were too poor to afford cash payments (Mwale and Mawele 1998). In response to this the government established the Agricultural Credit Management Programme (ACMP) in 1994 to ‘complement’ private sector initiatives for financial service provision and fertiliser marketing. Again poor recovery rates and heavy dependency on government crippled programme operations. Challenges of private sector financing persisted forcing the government to form the Market Credit Revolving Fund (MCRF) which together with the Crop Storage Revolving Fund were to be phased out by 1996 (Robinson et al. 2007; Zulu et al. 2015). It was hoped that by then strong private sector participation in agriculture would emerge to succeed government.

However, this argument was overly emphasised as the government appeared ill-prepared for this policy adjustment. Some of this include failure to address immediate rural livelihood shocks such as livestock disease outbreaks (Zulu et al. 2015; Chiwele et al. 1998). This combined with El Nino induced drought of 1991/1992, led to a sharp decline in agricultural output (Figure 1). Overtime however, FRA’s mandate has transformed to include farmer price support, administration of fertiliser credit program linked to pan-territorial pricing. This move did not only make private sector fertiliser uncompetitive but also – like historical programs – left the institution indebted (Govereh et al 2008).

Meanwhile donor and government efforts were – in implementing government policy on maize market liberalisation and market reforms of 1994 – to be organised through the established Agricultural Sector Investment Programme (ASIP). Its core functions included promotion of free market development, and reduce government participation in commercial activities with sub-programs touching on 1) irrigation 2) farm power and mechanisation 3) agricultural finance and, 4) rural investment fund (Robinson et al. 2007).

Whilst challenges of fund disbursement on the part of government as well as donors have been cited for failure of this programme, one crucial success was increased role

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5 However, poor private sector response is arguably directly related to enduring public sector interventionist approach in Zambia (see Robinson et al. 2007).
of out-grower schemes and capacity enhancement in the ministry (Zulu et al. 2015). However, agricultural expansion and interest in out-grower schemes arguably reflects the collapse of central planning and demise of marketing boards presenting profitability potential for agri-businesses. Whilst interpretations vary, we can thus link donor and government interest in development and rehabilitation of infrastructure such as rural access roads, irrigation and market facilities to the ASIP as well as the Rural Investment Fund. This somehow has repositioned government’s role in the sector particularly in post-2000, a period considered the highlight of large scale agricultural investments (LaSAIs) and agricultural expansion in Zambia.

**Era of New Agro-Vision? Renewed State Involvement in Agriculture: 2001-to date**

Despite attempts to boost private sector participation in agriculture and reduce state interventions in the 1990s, the period largely witnessed sluggish private sector participation and flow of investments. Budget allocations by GRZ to agriculture reached 7.2% of national expenditure in 2014, with 52% of this targeted at FISP and FRA spending (Kuteya 2013), and remains short of the CAADP 10% target. Agricultural policy in the post 2001 period has seen renewed and expanded state involvement in agriculture whilst seeking wider private sector participation shaped mainly by two key factors. First is the political argument that points to the policy and public expenditure on agriculture whose central feature has been to garners rural votes – with the crop increasingly tagged locally as a ‘political crop.’ Second and related to the former is an economic argument connected to improved fiscal discipline, 2005 debt relief and buoyant copper prices that offered financial leverage for expanded public expenditure on agriculture (Zulu et al. 2015). One consequence has been a double wave LaSAIs that started in 2001 to 2007 (as first wave) and from 2008 to date (as second wave) (Manda et al. 2018 forthcoming; Land Matrix 2016).

Meanwhile, input support was back on the political agenda through a three-year Fertiliser Support Program (FSP) – maize seed and fertiliser – in 2002 and later restructured and renamed to Farmer Input Support Programme (FISP) in 2009. According to Mason et al (2013:613) between 2004 and 2011, “FISP accounted for an average of 30% of total GRZ agricultural sector spending, and 47% of GRZ agricultural sector Poverty Reduction Programme (PRP) spending”. A 2015 analysis of spending areas by Kuteya et al. (2016) shows that FRA accounted for 23%, and FISP 31% of the total GRZ agricultural budget. Whilst FISP allocation swelled by 55% (ZMK1.1 billion) in 2015, only 56% of small-scale farmers were receiving FISP support (PMRC 2015). FRA and FISP combined accounted for 96% of poverty reduction programs in the agriculture sectoral budget allocation in 2014 compared to 93% in 2013 (Kuteya 2013). Meanwhile the FRA Act was repealed allowing for an expanded mandate of the FRA in maize purchase with the FRA purchasing an increasing proportion of maize production from below 40% in 2002 to as high as 90% in 2013 (Zulu et al. 2015). Another source suggests FRA smallholder maize market share or purchases as share of expected and actual maize sales varied between 16% (2003) and 86% (2007) to 83% in 2011 (Mason and Myers 2011). Presidential elections are arguably seen as largely influenced by the rural vote and in 2009/2010 elections the FRA witnessed a record 303.7% (883,000 MT) increase in maize purchase from the previous year’s
218,714 MT, followed by another 98.3% (1,751,000 MT) increase in 2010/2011. Whilst subsequent 2012 (407,113) and 2013 (426,248) fell within FRA buffer stock mandate (500,000MT), 2014 saw yet another 141.95% increase (1,031,303MT) (Zulu et al. 2015).

The new Zambian agricultural policy (2012-2030) makes provision to integrate gender across all levels in agriculture. According to the Zambian government, despite these provisions to ensure integration, women involved in agriculture in Zambia have not been able to "fully seize the opportunities provided by the liberalized government" due to constraints such as access to land, credit services, training and extension services. According to Farnworth and Munachonga (2012), implementation across all levels has been weak due to lack of gender knowledge and adequate practical skills among staff in respect to integrating and mainstreaming gender in their programs. Institutions such as Gender in Development division and the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives are hugely underfunded and understaffed, affecting their capacity to implement policies across levels.

The country ranks 124 out of 137 on the UN Gender Inequality Index (GII). This means that women, most especially, are disadvantaged in reproductive health, empowerment and the labor market. Zambia is a signatory to the SADC Gender Protocol 2015 (though they have not ratified it). In the southern Africa region, Zambia ranks 10 out of 15 on the Southern African Gender and Development Index. According to Stockemer (2011), women’s representation in parliament in Zambia dropped after the 2011 elections to 11% and the percentage of women in local government was at 6%. However, Evans (2016) suggests that women are increasingly entering leadership roles, and some gender stereotypes relating to women in leadership positions are being eroded.

The following table 1 present an overview of the structural dynamics in agriculture in Zambia over this period.
Table 1.1: Summary on the dynamics of structural change in Zambia

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agricultural Policies</strong></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>• Agricultural modernisation through plantations and farm-blocks within colonial extraction</td>
<td>• State-led investment</td>
<td>• Removal of input subsidies and decontrol of maize producer prices</td>
<td>• Widened foreign agribusiness participation in agriculture</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Transformation of customary land arrangements in chiefdoms</td>
<td>• 80% nationalisation of the economy</td>
<td>• Dismantling of parastatal and co-operatives</td>
<td>• High productivity/commercial agriculture</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Individualised and patriarchal land access and utilisation that entrenched property ownership (dual land tenure)</td>
<td>• Agricultural subsidy expansion (e.g. rural co-operatives)</td>
<td>• Promotion of private sector participation</td>
<td>• Renewed public expenditure on input subsidies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Extensification</td>
<td>• Agricultural modernisation imperative</td>
<td>• Agricultural modernisation for market-driven growth</td>
<td>• Agricultural expansion, modernisation for market driven growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Designation and taxation of customary land</td>
<td>• In practice, there was limited structural transformation and diversification away from maize focus</td>
<td>• Land reforms</td>
<td>• Expanding interest in irrigation</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Industrialisation- underpinned by agricultural transformation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key actors</strong></td>
<td>Customary arrangements, Tribal authorities, European commercial investors, Native agriculturalists</td>
<td>Government, Donors (e.g. World Bank, IMF, Commonwealth Development Commission)</td>
<td>Government (but significantly reduced state investment)</td>
<td>Donors (but slow)</td>
<td>• Diversification (e.g. services, processing) (NAP 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social controls (before 1895), No land market</td>
<td></td>
<td>Donors (but slow)</td>
<td>Private sector (but sluggish)</td>
<td>• Intensification- climate smart agriculture under donor influence</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Private sector (but sluggish)</td>
<td>NGO involvement</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Agricultural outcomes</strong></td>
<td><strong>Inclusion of women and youth</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Peasant and pastoral societies</td>
<td>Women and youth embedded in customary relations (these are not uniform, unfixed or unchanging)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dominant peasant and pastoral mode</td>
<td>Dual land tenure entrenched</td>
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<tr>
<td>Large schemes- e.g. maize and tobacco</td>
<td>Taxation requires increased waged work</td>
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<tr>
<td>Failure of cooperatives</td>
<td>Mining expansion meant increased home production burden on women and youth</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disruption of peasant mode in some places</td>
<td>Unclear role of women and youth in local cooperatives</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low structural transformation and diversification</td>
<td>Increasing access to education</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agricultural decline</td>
<td>Beijing Declaration on Rights of Women (1995)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low private-sector participation</td>
<td>Special seats and women's representation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Food production fail to keep pace with population expansion</td>
<td>Increasing influence of NGOs working on women's rights (e.g. Women for Change)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lack of diversification of agriculture and rural livelihoods</td>
<td>SAPs cause decline in access to education and other public services</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agricultural growth and expansion</td>
<td>National Youth Policy (1994)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agribusiness expansion</td>
<td>Educated Youth unemployment (Youth Empowerment Programs/Funds)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agricultural expansion (land-grabbing)</td>
<td>Increased visibility of women in education and formal employment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clear extensification in some areas; decline in some areas; and intensification in some areas</td>
<td>Legal reform on ownership giving women rights to land (Draft Land Policy)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marketing agencies</td>
<td>Civil society focus on women- access to loans</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGOs actors</td>
<td>Gender consideration in poverty reduction strategies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tribal Authorities in releasing land</td>
<td>Educated Youth unemployment (Youth Empowerment Programs/Funds)</td>
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</table>
Expanding corporate interest in Zambia agriculture has brought forth an ongoing debate about how agricultural expansion intensifies production on existing landholdings. Urbanisation, demand and population growth and large-scale agricultural investments (LaSAIs) as they relate to the recent economic crisis (2007/2008) has tended to pressurise landholdings through area expansion and intensification of production (Manda et al 2017). Agricultural intensification has however been presented as being a crucial solution to the problems facing the continent, but any positive evaluation of LaSAIs and ensuing intensity of agricultural production on existing landholdings centrally lies in whether this intensification and ensuing transformation is inclusive and sustainable. Inclusionary as well as exclusionary dynamics in diverse production systems across sub-Saharan Africa cannot easily be generalised. Incorporation of specific societal groups across class, age, disability ethnicity and gender vary. Whereas these experiences vary depending on production structure, commodity focus and nature of value-chains, they can also be shaped by growth, evolution and transformations in agricultural policy and institutional processes and practices. Macro-level policy and institutional elements thus play a crucial role in determining inclusionary or exclusionary dynamics in agricultural processes and practices. Thus, the role and participation of various actors vis a vis donors becomes important in shaping not only the policy direction, priorities and preferences but also spaces for local inclusion – the so called enabling environment.

How these policy and institutional dynamics contribute to equity in ongoing processes of intensification however depends on various elements including mediatory actors and processes at meso and micro-level. Some of these relate to farmer-based membership organisations and related extension services, investors as ‘new’ actors, traders as they relate to market dynamics and most importantly local authorities who become important in determining which land is available, to be accessed by whom and how to be worked and utilised. Coherence and interplay between macro stated policy objectives and micro-level practices – one of the key challenges facing African economies – relate to meso-level resources and capabilities and most importantly coordination between and among various sectors (Kalaba et al. 2013; Manda et al. 2017). At the local level, how policies are interpreted, translated and implemented greatly shape farmer experiences and most importantly what sort of support services are available. In countries such as Zambia where dual land tenure systems persist, understanding local farmer experiences crucially requires understanding how formalised institutions and informalised processes play out. Social norms and customary arrangements exert enormous influence on water, land and ecosystem services, but intensification as well as extensification as they relate to corporate expansion exert pressure on these processes – recently invoking neo-colonial narratives of ‘resource grabbing’. 
CHAPTER 2
THE FORMAL AND INFORMAL RULES OF THE GAME

This section explores systems of agricultural support operating at national and district levels. In doing so it is necessary to identify formal policies and processes as they are stated, and also how they are implemented in practice. In many cases there is a significant gap between systems in theory and operation in practice. In addition, agricultural change is also mediated by informal institutions, such as customary ownership of land or social norms relating to women and youth. It is very important that social norms are not understood as fixed, uniform and unchanging. In this report we focus on two areas of policy only in relation to the Farm Input Support Programe (FISP) and ongoing processes of land reform and dynamics, including LaSAIs.

Discussions on agriculture in Zambia tend to be dominated by discussion of FISP and on land allocations. FISP in particular is critical given that it is the main form of state interaction with smallholder farmers (Harmer 2015) and in this sense, is also characterised as a key component of social protection provision.

Farmer Input Support Program (FISP)

Farm Input Subsidy Program (FISP) and Food Reserve Agency (FRA) are the main policies dominating the agriculture spaces in Zambia currently, and consuming the majority of the agricultural budget. FRA works as a parastatal agency for the government that purchase maize from farmers above the current market/privatized wholesale prices and maize purchased deposited into commercial mills. Participating actors in the execution of their role include Zambian National Farmers Union (ZNFU), The Millers Association of Zambia, rural smallholder farmers, in addition to state/cabinet actors. Similar actors dominate FISP space, in addition to fertilizer companies, elite farmers and civil societies. FRA and FISP have been termed as a "political social contract between smallholder farmers and the state and a public sector sponsored out-grower scheme" respectively (Gumbo et al., 2016).

The Fertiliser Support Program (FSP) (2001-2009) and its successor Fertiliser Input Support Program (FSP) (2009-Date) form the central driver of agriculture and rural production in Zambia. Although subsidies declined during the 1990s they were again reinvigorated and gained momentum in the post-2000s. The FISP is implemented through the Ministry of Agriculture with an aim of providing farmers with a subsidy of 50% towards purchase of chemical fertilisers and hybrid maize seed. The policy objectives include boosting food security. FISP now comprises 4 bags of 50 kilogram fertiliser and 10 kilogram maize seed to increase the efficiency of input use by farmers and increase the number of beneficiaries (Harman 2015; PMRC 2015). The distribution of packages to beneficiaries is through local cooperative groups. For a farmer to qualify, they should: 1) belong to a cooperative, 2) be a smallholder within coverage
area, 3) be viable including ability to cultivate at least 1ha, and 4) ability to co-finance initial 50% payment.

Like other programmes of this type, the system for targeting farmers is based on the local governance structures. In Zambia there is National, Provincial and District Administration, with sub-District, Area Committees (ACs) heavily intersecting with ‘traditional’ leadership. Inclusion in the FISP is at the level of the AC and there are donor supported efforts to create national registry to reduce fraud in community-based targeting (interviews 2018). There are a number of female chiefs in the country.

There are unclear guidelines on composition of cooperatives and implication on women and youths which again raises stakes for local power relations and rent-seeking behaviour (Kuteya et al. 2016). A key assumption here is that local leaders are accountable and embody full knowledge about local constituencies and potential beneficiaries to follow targeting guidelines.

Whilst FISP is argued by policy makers to have increased food/maize production and security among beneficiaries, the evidence for this is in dispute (Mason & Tembo 2015, Zulu et al 2014). Interview data (Manda in 2016 and Mdee in 2018) shows how increased subsidies particularly in the post-2000 coincide with political victories and the centrality of rural vote. National interviews (by Manda) with key stakeholders conducted between 2015 and 2016 show that FISP and FRA is not an effective mechanism for transforming smallholder agriculture and encouraging wider participation of women and youth. The Policy Monitoring & Research Centre (PMRC 2015) reports how 78% of the maize purchased by the FRA came from large-scale farmers who cultivated land from 2ha up to 20ha, and therefore suggests that the FRA subsidies better-off farmers rather than the poorest and those cultivating land holdings smaller than 2ha.

Characterised by poor targeting, unclear guidelines on women and youth’s participation, input leakages, a widely held view among national actors is that FISP remains insufficient in in addressing gender disparities and inclusion (Machina et al. 2017). Recent reports show that major beneficiaries were not poorest households, raising elements of elite capture and widening involvement of local elites. Similarly, recent reports such as those by Chapoto et al. (2015) and Kuteya et al. (2016) show how distributors, transporters and fertiliser companies stand to make most gains from FISP, heightening leakages and rent-seeking tendencies. Furthermore, Zulu et al (2014) tended to influence farmer’s decisions on how much land to allocate to maize production, and therefore restricts diversification.

This disappointing background is seen to have paved way for the introduction of the electronic voucher (E-Voucher) system piloted in 2015/16 farming season. The
E-Voucher system is driven by the idea of enhancing efficiency, diversification\(^7\) as well as increase private sector participation. A web-based system uses a mobile delivery and tracking system to distribute subsidised products through private-sector suppliers to targeted farmers. The E-Voucher is seen to allow for real time registration of beneficiaries and electronic payment to the agro-dealers and retail agents as distributors of products thereby reducing delays (Machina et al. 2017; PMRC 2015). Whilst it is too early to evaluate the E-Voucher system in Zambia, its implementation thus far has been described as chaotic in interviews with national and district stakeholders in 2018). The Zambian National Farmers Union (ZNFU) is vocal in its criticism of the e-voucher implementation (interviews 2018) and Calvin Kaleyi writing in their magazine (December 2017) that: "We are seeing the same mistakes that happened in 2005, the same that happened in 2007 and 2012 and 2013; delayed inputs, poor targeting of farmers, maybe added also, that not so agriculture conversant -players are driving the FISP process”.

Kaleyi goes on to say, that although the e-voucher has reduced the number of ‘ghost-farmers’, it has opened new avenues of exploitation for agro-dealers who accept the vouchers.

Interviews at the District level (2018) also confirm the implementation problems: "there are far too many players in the new system- the banks, companies, FAO, and this is leading to a lack of co-ordination. If farmers don’t get the inputs at the right time, then it is useless. In the District, the FISP absorbs most of our time and resources. We have significant challenges for agricultural extension officers- with transport, accommodation and operating funds”.

The fact that the government still co-finances inputs for smallholders’ challenges private sector participation, diversification as well as inclusion of women and youth. Oxfam in Zambia reports that it is working explicitly in making FISP more gender sensitive. These two already marginalised categories of smallholders face further exclusion on two fronts. The first is inclusion in somewhat elite-dominated cooperatives and second is on cost of co-financing.

**Land ownership and Equity in Zambia**

Zambia is generally considered land abundant, however current land scarcities have been seen to have a direct impact on women and youth especially within and among social relations. Prominently, post-1990 neoliberal reforms heightened debates about land access and ownership for women. Land dynamics over the years has been less inclusive in Zambia. This is more important given that frequently quoted figures of 94% customary land and 6% statutory land have become outdated with recent studies by Sitko and Chamberlin (2016) pegging customary land in Zambia now at 51-54%. Whilst recognition of customary land was sustained in the 1995 Land Act, the legal

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\(^7\) As farmers are allowed to redeem inputs of their choice beyond maize.
framework is seen to have seriously eroded the role and power of traditional authorities in land. It is equally seen to have entrenched state power in land allocations even in customary areas. In practice, land conversion such as those in agricultural projects have paid less attention to local social economic concerns. A report by the Human Rights Watch in Mkushi show how state induced land use and agricultural expansion led to displacement and abuse of local rights (e.g. force evictions) (HRW 2017). Within eroding traditional authority and of importance in this evidence is that "many people do not have a say about what happens to the land” and that most importantly “women often have even less to say” (HRW 2017, p6). These concerns are even more striking when one looks at struggles around food and water in which women play a greater role. However, it is critical to note that traditional leaders are often complicit in land transfers. Interviewees at all levels in Jan 2018, agreed that it is common for traditional leaders to release land to incoming investors, either independently or at the behest of government. Whilst wider community consultation is supposed to carried out, this does not often happen.

As the land grabbing wave hits Zambia, CSOs such as the Zambia Land Alliance (ZLA) have pushed an agenda for Land Policy in Zambia leading to the development of a Draft Land Policy. ‘Press communication from ZLA reports that the draft policy makes a “clear pronouncement on 50% women empowerment though it lacks clear implementation plans; unclear measures for the enhancement of youth and that the “measure to reduce age of owning land from 21 to 18 is not enough to guarantee youth land rights.” These concerns raised are necessary because land access and ownership dynamics around women and youth, have over the years received little attention from the legal and administration frameworks in Zambia. Instead, policy focus and emphasis has been placed on land use expansion for agriculture, irrigation expansion and economic diversification (Manda et al., 2017). However, land titling may not be the answer. Interviewees (Jan 2018) suggest that land abundance means that land access is not a huge issue for those that want it, the constraint rather lies in the capital and labour resources to use it.

Wider concerns in land and agriculture have been less vigorously pursued by CSOs, with very peripheral impacts. Due to State-donor and private sector dominance, CSOs still face restrictive space for participation which – together with local actors – must content the top-down nature of agricultural transformation (Phiri et al. 2015). (More exposition on CSOs strategies and motivations in agriculture will be discussed in subsequent sections). For instance, ActionAid has been somewhat active on agriculture and tax justice whilst Oxfam works to influence policy on agriculture and sustainable development. Care international and Civil Society for Poverty Reduction have interest in agriculture and poverty reduction. The Zambia Land Alliance on the other side is concerned about land governance, availability, access and utilisation.

Land ownership and use dynamics are highly illustrative of the wider political economy of Zambia as is shown in table 2 below.

Land ‘grab’ is certainly a significant concern expressed in stakeholder interviews, with one interview from civil society stating that:
"Land grabs are the new HIV. It is coming silently, the impact is not immediate, and you don’t know what it will be until it is too late. Investors are coming in huge numbers and taking large tracts of land. Awareness of this is minimal. The Zambians are sleeping and we’ll only wake up when the land is gone- maybe in 10 or 15 years."

Table 2.1: Land ownership and policy dynamics in Zambia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Era</th>
<th>Key features</th>
<th>Outcomes and Land ownership evidence</th>
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</table>
| Pre-colonial         | ▪ Land access and ownership based on customary arrangements, customs and traditions  
▪ Centrality of traditional authorities in determining land availability, access and utilisation | ▪ Land ownership widely inclusive as communally owned shaped by families, clans or other groupings                                 |
| Colonial era         | ▪ Introduction of dual land system: communal (native reserves (for indigenous peoples) and private as crown land (freehold tenure for Europeans)  | ▪ Eroded power of traditional authorities  
▪ Skewed land ownership towards colonialists  
▪ Heightening dynamics of land ownership among women and youth |
▪ All land is vest in the power of the President. | ▪ Limited land market expansion  
▪ Tight state control of land  
▪ Limited conversion of customary to statutory land |
Neoliberalism era (1991-2018)

- The 1995 Lands Act
- Conversion of customary land to leasehold
- Facilitate foreign access to land
- Draft land policy (explicit focus on women access to land)
- Increased agribusiness acquisitions of land (Manda et al. 2017)
- Domestic elites and foreign investors dominant
- Marginalised poor such as women and youth facing exclusion (Brown 2005).

Research by Andersson Djurfeldt and Hillbom (2016), using Afrint data, from Mkushi and Mazabuka regions shows that even if land size holdings keeps on rising for both Male Headed Households (MHHs) and Female Headed Households (FHHs), the relative size of holdings held by FHHs shrunk between 2008-2013 from 58% to 46%. In the case of increased land inequality in Zambia, thus, FHHs are more likely to suffer than MHHs. Data from the Afrint data set used by Afrint IV/Papaya confirm these findings for the period 2002 to 2015 (see Andersson Djurfeldt, 2018). Women can easily acquire land through a male relative. For instance, in Chibombo (located in the central province in Zambia), women lose their land after the death of their spouse or sometimes asked to leave their spouse’s village (Kajoba, 2002). This observation however differs from province to province and village to village, dependent on whether the inheritance system is patrilineal or matrilineal. According to Chapoto et al. 2009, Women living in matrilineal societies however have more secure land rights.

The constitution of Zambia and the Lands Act supports women’s access to land and vehemently stands against gender-based discrimination. However, most lands in Zambia are customary lands and operated under customary rules. Over 80% of smallholder farms are located on customary lands. Chiefs in rural areas are known as the custodian of the natural resources and are mainly involved in giving out lands for agriculture purposes- a practice that has been described by Gumbo et al (2016) as against the central government’s wish.

It has been noted above that there is a dynamic of increasing differentiation within and between households in Zambia. Matenga & Hichwaamba (2017) explore three models of land commercialisation in Zambia, and find older and wealthier men are those who are benefiting most from opportunities for accumulation.
Chapter 3

INCENTIVES AND INTERACTIONS

In this section we consider the dynamics and interactions between actors in agricultural support. We analyse the broad context, and then focus on the incentives and interactions in relation with a consideration of the inclusion possibilities for women and youth. We consider the power dynamics between actors, and where significant change appears to be most effectively driven. In the case of Zambia, we specifically focus on donor organisations, state, agri-business companies, CSOs and local authorities.

Dynamics and narratives

State-donor-agribusiness relations play a dominant role in agriculture (Manda et al. 2017) and this network is known to affect relations between and among various actors. Lack of accountability combined with a lack of transparent governance. For instance, data shows that increased financialisation in sugarcane in Mazabuka was not accompanied by more decentralised decision-making around taxation and regulation (Richardson 2010). Power in agricultural decision-making remains concentrated in the central state and the elite donor-agribusiness alliances. Monitoring and evaluation activities thus remain poor (confirmed in interviews in 2016 and Jan 2018).

As Manda et al. (2017) notes, there is a significant gap between stated policy and actual practice. Official initiatives such as sugarcane outgrower schemes in Mazabuka are small-scale and often vulnerable to elite capture (Matenga & Hichaambwa 2017; Hall et al. 2017). Incorporating local actors in development prioritisation, planning and implementation would could be key in determining inclusivity around agricultural expansion. However, as we have already seen in the previous section, where traditional leaders are involved in FISP and land allocations, there are concerns over localised manipulation and elite-capture. Figure 1 captures the relations between key players and figure 2 extends this to consider modes of agriculture.

This is illustrated by Manda in figure 3.1 below and denotes the donor-agribusiness-state elite alliances as being of high influence in driving policy dynamics, with an emphasis on out-grower schemes and foreign commercial investment. Whereas a lower influence discourse relating to land rights, conservation agriculture and diversification is evident in the interactions of CSOs, NGOs and inter-sectoral alliances in agriculture.

Taking conservation agriculture (CA) as an example, relating directly to the objective of sustainable intensification, CA practice has been written into policy documents since the 1990s, but given the focus of agricultural spending on FISP and FRA has received little implementation focus. Rather than being state-led, the Zambia National Farmers’ Union set us the Conservation Farming Unit (CFU) to address land degradation issues (Andersson & D’Souza 2014). Dr Henrietta Kalinda (interview in 2018) of the Kasisi Organic Agriculture Training Centre also confirms that long term work on transforming
agriculture using low input methods exists in these networks in Zambia and can be influential on a local basis.

Figure 3.1. Incentives and Interactions in Zambian Agriculture

Figure 3.2 below sets out the model for agricultural transformation as visualised by the state-agribusiness-donor vision. Whilst current classification of a small holder denotes a plot of less than 2ha, with larger farmers having holdings of 2-20ha. A transformed agricultural sector would classify a smallholder farmer as having a holding of 25-50 ha and support would be tailored to these classifications. The model sets aside existing commercial farmers. The model also allows for the collectivisation of current smallholders into larger land units, and we will explore this further in looking at the case of irrigation below. The model raises more questions than it answers, particularly relating to the aggregation of current small holders.
Figure 3.2. State-donor-agribusiness relations and agricultural expansion models in Zambia
MINISTRY AND EXECUTIVE TEAM OF ZAMBIAN GOVERNMENT

The power of the central government lies in the hand of a few actors and is highly centralized, it is also influenced by donors to a considerable extent. Figure 3 below attempts to capture lines of policy influence.

Interviews by the Indaba Agricultural Policy Research Institute (IAPRI) indicates that the Ministry of Finance and National Planning is the next in power down the command line. They have control over the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, Food Reserve Agency and Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry in terms of budgetary allocations and pricing policies. The ability to influence agriculture policies as seen above does not lie in the hands of the Minister of Agriculture and Livestock. According to Chapoto et al. (2015), Zambian agriculture policy will see bold and positive change if only the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock was set as an independent body devoid of influence from the executive (specifically the President). Policies in the sector are only set into motion if and only if the President and Minister of Finance all agree to the change. Actions like the reduced price of maize being purchased by the FRA, for example, might be emanating from the executive with little or no influence from relevant line ministries. Whose order it is, according to Chapoto is still not clear in Zambia’s agricultural politics, since it remains convoluted. Yet, such actions leave no budgetary accountability from the parliament and the Ministry of Finance.

One silent group that plays an active role in Zambian agriculture policy change is the technical division of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock. Policies are spearheaded or championed actively if they realized that there is something to be gained from the change. For example, the enactment of the Agricultural Marketing Bill(AMB) failed/stalled because technical officers perceived it as a threat to their jobs and losing their control over the agriculture sector in the country. The AMB was being prepared to set up an Agriculture Marketing Council that would oversee the marketing issues related to FISP. Though the technical group’s role in promoting change in agriculture policy in Zambia is low comparative to the Minister of Agriculture and Livestock, Chapoto et al. (2015) noted from their interviews that, so far as the intention of the policy from the technical officers remain mixed, the Minister will not have confidence in promoting the agriculture policy change to the cabinet and the executive.

DONORS

Donors are key movers of agricultural policy and practice, especially in the post-donor driven land reform of 1995 and post 2000 wave of large-scale scale foreign investments in Zambia (Manda et al. 2017). These have expanded under wider themes such as climate mitigation, gender empowerment, value-chain development including rural development. Given the nature of Zambia’s economy, donors do not dominate national discourse as they do in some countries, but they do fund significant parts of the domestic budget and projects. In 2018, approximately 16% of government income will be from external grants or loans (PMRC 2018). This does not include separately financed project interventions.

PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) in Zambia gained momentum with the passing of the PPP Act in 2009, and are a central strategy of agricultural transformation in the dominant vision explored in figure 3.2. They have been advanced for various reasons including enhancing private sector investment and participation in agriculture. Typical examples of PPPs include those in the sugar industry. To understand PPP, we will evaluate the role of private companies in Zambian agriculture.

PRIVATE COMPANIES
The role of private companies in agricultural development in Zambia is significant in sugar production, as well as cotton, paprika, and tobacco (Matenga, 2017). They are encouraged to support small-holder farmers throughout grower schemes where they provide farmers with outputs, markets and extension services—an initiative with significant levels of inequalities. Gumbo et al (2016) note that this is often with support and guidance from the government. The Zambian government however retains strong market control in the maize sector. Taking cues from the UNIP’s experience where President Kaunda was removed from power under the 1986 Copperbelt Food riot (caused by hike in maize prices and withdrawal of maize subsidies), government believe the agriculture and food production is “too sensitive” to be left in the hands of private companies (Mofya-Mukuka and Kabaghe, 2014). Thus, liberalization in the agriculture sector in Zambia is a difficult venture, especially for politicians and it is believed that out-grower schemes will provide a means to reduce inflated cost of subsidies and extension services to farmers and to improve rural development. In Nyumba, the most active PPPs are NWK (formerly Dunavant) (cotton) and Alliance One (tobacco) supported by the Cotton Board of Zambia and Tobacco Board of Zambia, respectively. Farmers such as those in Nega-Nega have been encouraged to establish farmer companies that work alongside commercial agribusiness. However, frameworks for establishing such companies are silent on how farmer associations should be formed. They are equally silent on gender dynamics and the role of youth raises questions of how inclusive PPPs are.

Some of these concerns relate to consequences of commercialisation and control of production resources on women (Hall et al. 2017). Projects such as Magobbo and Kaleya within sugarcane show how exclusive PPPs can be, when characterised by poor consultation on land issues, and a lack of transparency on investments. Magobbo for instance is an EU funded project, but women representation and participation of youth remain disappointing. Matenga (2017) for instance, observed that only 10% of the youth employed under the Magobbo Sugar cane scheme were young females. The young women moreover were involved in less labour-intensive activities such as weeding, disease control and planting which subsequently means low wages as compared to their male counterparts who were involved in more labour intensive activities like irrigation and truck driving. Employability on the sugar cane field depends on the individual’s physical abilities and discipline to work. Apart from this gendered inequality, household inequality is highly dominant. According to Matenga 2017 (and confirmed in interviews with Matenga 2018) under this out-grower scheme, Zambian Sugar (ZSC) employs one individual from each household in the Magobbo area. However, locals have complained that the company has been bringing in migrants.
from other provinces to work. Also, some households are excluded from participating or working in the fields or the company. Thus, a venture that has been deemed as a win-win for the actors has skewed benefits towards ZSC and migrants from other provinces, degrading its pro-poor objectives.

ZAMBIA NATIONAL FARMERS UNION

ZNFU has been one of the most active participants and actor in Zambian agriculture policy arena (Sitko et al., 2017). They have the largest influence in comparison to actors like Millers Association of Zambia (MAZ) and Grain Traders Association (GTAZ). According to Chapoto et al., (2015), they have direct access to main actors like the state house (executive wing of the government) and private fertilizer companies. ZNFU membership is mainly made up of highly connected elite and former/current civil servant workers who are highly connected to policy making structures rather than poor smallholder farmers (Sitko and Jayne, 2014), although it is clear in interviews and publications that ZNFU are vocal on issues of concern to smaller farmers and on matters of gender inclusion. Just as described above, ZNFU's main role has been centered around negotiating for subsidized price of inputs and input provision to smallholder farmers and also for higher market price for outputs (particularly maize). It is not clear how ZNFU succeeds or fail in their lobbying attempts, but it is obvious they are quite successful in influencing policies around maize rather than other crops. For example, their attempt to kick against the importation of wheat failed whilst they were able to champion the increase in the price of maize on the market.

FERTILIZER COMPANIES

Fertilizer company/production is a booming business in Zambia (Chapoto et al., 2015). To be able to qualify for contracts from the new government like the FISP, private fertilizer companies need to support the campaigns of these political parties. However, not all companies have this advantage creating an unequal playing field for Zambian fertilizer companies. The less advantaged companies do however support the FISP through an e-voucher system whereas those with direct links to the Executive win the tenders for FISP and continues to lobby to their advantage.

CIVIL SOCIETY

Accountability and open information is a hurdle in Zambian politics. The Zambian government is yet to enact the Access to Information Bill which is being championed by the Zambian Media Council to improve government transparency. It is thus difficult to assess information and analyze data concerning government performance. The information climate in Zambia makes it difficult for civil groups/societies to question parliament behaviour or the executive. Based on this observation, Chapoto et al, (2015) suggested that to be able to influence decisions and policies in the agriculture sector in Zambia, actors or network with the largest influence need to be targeted (thus in these scenarios the group with the most influence and power is the State and the Executive wing of government). As mentioned in the previous chapter, a number of NGOs are involved in policy and advocacy work at the national level on both land access, as well as agricultural development. Oxfam for example is phasing out project
based direct delivery of agricultural projects to work on policy and advocacy on agricultural issues, including promoting gender and youth inclusive policy change.

Some Business and organizations in Zambia recognizes gender equity as a "social welfare" issue, thus integrating gender at the implementation stage of their projects affects the success of their projects (Farnworth and Munachonga (2011). Women are responsible for most agricultural labour in Zambia. Intensity of labour increases for Female Headed Households(FHHs) where they need to hoe the land themselves or pay male labourers. In some locations, commanding male labourers also is an arduous task for FHHs especially during peak seasons, affecting productivity on their farms. For women in matrilineal ethnic groups, possession and access to land do not always mean control or wellbeing. They are constantly constrained with the ability to effectively make decisions for their families especially relating to expenditure and sales of assets. In terms of government funded projects like the FISP, Smale et al (2014)
observes that FHHs that benefit from FISP are no better than a MHH non-beneficiary of the program.

At the community level, research shows that Rural Producer Organisations (RPOs) play a pivotal role in empowering and facilitating gender equity and equality in Zambia. For example, in the Mpika district where the Development Organisation for People’s Empowerment (DOPE) is highly active, they coordinate several mini organisations and sub-affiliates where women dominate and in addition are offered micro-credit services to meet their needs. Market-led organisations such as DOPE, unlike government funded RPOs are highly successful in promoting gender equity in terms of helping its members gain access to services, inputs, credit and markets. Government’s RPOs were mainly set up to build social capital to manage resources like seed banks (Farnworth and Munachonga, 2012) and are male dominated hindering women from articulating their specific needs.

According to Andersson Djurfeldt and Hillbom (2016), villages that had increased income levels despite low maize production were actively participating in the FRA and FISP program through the formation of cooperatives. In the village of Chilekwa for example, farmers had formed cooperatives and through that were making “creative” use of the government initiatives. Cooperatives are thus trading groups that can easily access government subsidized fertilizers to increase production, use profits from yield to assemble maize from other farmers in the village immediately after harvest and resell the assembled maize to the FRA later in the season. This business has replaced “full time farming” in some villages in Zambia. The success of this venture however also depends on linkages to external buyers outside FRA. This trend has a huge implication on farmers whose revenues/incomes do not qualify them to join these cooperatives.

In Zambia, the age category for youth falls between the ages of 18-35 years and almost half of Zambian population are calculated to be 15 years or below (Muzira et al, 2013). Across Africa, the youth are seen to be disengaging from agriculture and still perceive the sector as an activity for the aged or “uneducated”. Surveys conducted in most SSA countries reveal that youth find the agriculture as labour intensive, unprofitable, unstable with less innovation and infusion of technology. The youthful population specifically in Zambia are interested in quick and fast money and according to data gathered by the Southern African Confederation of Agricultural Unions (SACAU), horticulture, piggery and poultry farming are more profitable and attractive. Youth are identifying with the entrepreneurial side of a business, with easy access to resources, information, technology and education. The government of Zambia since 2000 has focused on the use of Youth Resource Centres (YRC) in championing the youth’s interest in agriculture. One prominent YRC operating in the country is the

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8 These observations varies from household to household especially if the FHH has older boy/sons or male relatives. In such scenarios, decision making in terms of subsidies might remain the duty of the male.
Ndola Youth Resource Centre (NYRC) which has been established in at least 4 provinces. With immense access to information technology, these centres equip young “agripreneurs” with the following; *networking and marketing skills, climate smart agriculture techniques, use of ICT in promoting agribusinesses, agribusiness management, weather and climate information, credit services, seed selection and research* etc. (IFAD, 2014). FAO estimates that over 500 young farmers benefit from this initiative. However, the youth are involved in other crops and animal such as pork, vegetables, groundnuts and goat meat instead of maize. Of course, as it typical of NGO initiatives this is a very small number and broader structural support to young “agripreneurs” is absent.

Interviews in Jan 2018, confirm that as in neighbouring countries, younger and educated people with access to capital resources are starting to view agriculture as an opportunity for investment.9

MARKETS AND INFRASTRUCTURE

In the previous chapters we have already noted the very strong influence that the Zambian government has on the maize market through the institutions of FISP and FRA. It is argued that other markets have suffered from this focus on maize, which distorts incentives for production and reduces diversification of production (Zulu et al 2014). However, sugar production and livestock are also significant components of the agricultural economy. Interviews with national stakeholders (Jan 2018) confirm that additional investment in small livestock production could be beneficial for women and youth, but that the political commitment to this is lacking. As an economy with a significant degree of urbanisation and road transport links to regional markets (such as DRC) then Zambia is seen to have potential in high value horticultural production.

The Zambian government has a stated commitment to invest in infrastructure as part of the strategy for not only linking Zambia but also for driving industrialisation. National development plans such as the 7NDP and Vision 2030 including the Industrialisation Strategy refer to infrastructure investments. This has happened in various areas including the Link-Zambia Campaign in road sector as it relates to the Nakara Corridor as well as irrigation infrastructure development in outgrower schemes such as in sugar (Manyonyo) (through the National irrigation policy and strategy) and in commercial farm-blocks such as in Mkushi. However, public financing remains challenging leading to project delays. However, this expansion impacts not only who benefits but also the resources (land and water) for rural livelihoods.

The issues of investment in irrigation show tensions similar to those found in neighbouring countries- irrigation investment is seen as critical in creating sustainable intensification and in increasing resilience to climate change. Yet, the transformational promise of irrigation has often not lived up to expectations. We illustrate this with a short case study from an extensive key informant interview with George Phiri- former national head of irrigation, and now consultant in the irrigation sector. The case

9 [http://newsvideo.su/video/7711186](http://newsvideo.su/video/7711186)
illustrates some of the incentives and interactions in upscaling irrigation. The themes raised in the case show a long-term attempt to pursue state investment in agricultural schemes, firstly through state-led schemes, then later through irrigation management transfer, then public-private partnership. George Phiri explained in detail the changing influences of donor priorities in the schemes.

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<th>Box 1: Case of Incentives and Interaction in the Zambian agriculture</th>
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| “In the past we established 100s of 5Ha community schemes for high value crops. These often have government field officers attached to them and government provided the infrastructure. JICA did a study on these and found they were mostly unsuccessful. In the late 80s/90s we were then encouraged to hand these over to the farmers in Irrigation Management Transfer (IMTs). The schemes were rehabilitated, and the farmers had intensive training. However, you cannot turn these farmers into scheme managers, and again this approach failed (despite funding from so many donors- World Bank, FAO, IFAD, Bilaterals).

So then we were encouraged to look at PPP solutions. The donors wanted us to encourage investment from outside. In 2010 I examined this and argued that we should try a PPP solution and we got support on the concept from the African Development Bank. At first they insisted that we should bring in outside investors, but we insisted that this would not be fair to the communities. It took a long time to get stakeholder buy-in on this.

We are now trying a model where we create a farmer owned company- the farmers donate their land to the company and they receive shares. But to farm efficiently and profitably then we need to consolidate this land and create a company to run it (with the right skills and management). The farmer-share holders will also benefit from being paid for their labour. The right technology is required- we’re not going to make a transformation with treadle pumps, so each scheme needs to be in the order of 200Ha. In some senses these schemes could be called co-operatives, but a Minister advised that we should not use this word, and so instead these are companies.

Of course, there have been many challenges in establishing these schemes but we have been progressively trying to solve them as they arise. We look at gender and inclusion issues- so for instance we ask farmers to nominate who will inherit their shares and this should be gender inclusive. We discourage using land as collateral- it is far too risky and people end up losing their land. People come to exploit the farmers with ‘slave loans’” |

The case above reflects the agricultural transformation dynamics at play in Zambia over the last 30 years. Irrigation is a central component of green revolution in African agriculture. However, the technical infrastructure of irrigation is less of a challenge than the institutional mechanisms required to manage it. It is uncertain how the model of farmer-owned companies will evolve. The current initiatives exist as donor-funded intervention and the sustainability and scalability of these schemes remains in doubt.
However, what is not in any doubt, is that the use of water resources for irrigation will necessitate institutional frameworks that can adjudicate competing demands for water.

As in other places, upscaling the use of irrigation in agriculture may exacerbate competition for water resources. George Phiri also attests that this is a huge concern, citing the example of the Kafue River. There is little capacity within current institutions to deal with competing use issues, and Zambia is only just in the process of setting up a catchment-based management system (although the capacity of such systems to manage the political allocation of water resources is in doubt (Mdee 2017). Without such mechanisms, water resources will be increasingly polluted and depleted.
CONCLUSION

This analysis of the political economy of agriculture in Zambia offers no easy answers to inclusive agricultural transformation.

Zambia is seen as slower than some neighbouring countries in institutionalising the participation of women in politics and policy spaces. It is also debateable whether this approach to inclusion (primarily the reservation of spaces in committees and women’s groups formed by NGO projects) is effective in transforming agriculture. It can be argued that women and youth will benefit from a strategic effort to transform small scale agriculture as a whole, through state-led investment, that addresses elite capture of resources, land, markets and incentives. Neither women nor youth are a unified category of persons with the same needs and interests. Committee and political reservations for women are likely to benefit elite and well-connected women who have far greater power than poor men (see Mdee 2008, or Tsikata 2016)

It is recommended that the Afrint IV/Papaya project considers the following critical issues:

Working with the policy-practice gap

There is a significant gap between stated agricultural policy and actual practice on the ground. Some evidence of Government-led initiatives is visible in fieldwork, but the scale is often limited. Donors are consistently mentioned as part of the problem in causing policy and practice fragmentation, and funding channeled through unsustainable project based intervention. Donors should also take time to understand local politics if their programmes are to make a difference regarding inclusive agriculture intensification. Whilst donors emphasise formal rules of the game, implementation is according to informal rules of the game hence the need to understand the local context of politics. Informal rules of the game facilitate distribution of resources by patronage – largely practised at the national and local levels of government in Zambia.

Despite a rhetorical commitment to decentralisation, it is central government that holds the critical power to act on agricultural and inclusion issues, as local government actors have little power or resource to do so. Incentives for actors are uneven and largely relate to incoming projects- related to donors funding and therefore operating on limited timescales. Public investment in infrastructure is patchy and often reliant on attracting donor and private funds. It is also common for projects to have capture of resources by local elites (particularly Traditional Authorities and Chiefs in this context), and therefore a limited impact on more marginalised farmers.
Despite policy commitment to a transformational role for private actors. This research finds that private sectors contract farming is frequently mentioned as problematic and exploitative by respondents. Contract farming may also be driving new processes of elite capital accumulation and land grab in the areas where this is practiced. Working with the realities of this policy-practice gap is essential for collaborative problem-solving.

**Agriculture and the politics of maize- Reforming and evolving FISP, and FRA is critical to inclusive and sustainable agricultural intensification**

The FISP and FRA takes a considerable amount of domestic agricultural spending. It has certainly contributed to smoothing food security in Zambia. In its current form, as an e-voucher, there is considerable criticism concerning delay in farmers receiving payments, and the limits of agricultural suppliers in providing diversified inputs. Both programmes have become a political necessity for the redistribution of resources, and of local level patronage, but it may be locking smallholders into an ultimately unsustainable cycle of maize production. The private sector-based provision of agro-inputs may be exacerbating this. Afrint IV/Papaya could form a platform for collaborative discussions of how FISP could support a sustainable and inclusive agricultural intensification.

**Farming as a collective and class enterprise**

Zambia has a long history of class differentiation in agricultural development. It has a relatively small population for the size of land, and a high level of urbanisation.

**Making agricultural intensification more inclusive is more than policy statements, women’s groups and land titling.**

There is no uniform gendered or youth experience, and policy statements on inclusion are vague and have little meaning in implementation. Women are seen are critical to agriculture, but the position of youth is more ambiguous. However- there are some educated urban youth who see agriculture as an investment opportunity- they have capital to invest.

Agriculture remains largely the business of the family unit, and inclusion initiatives must take this into account. Neither should the family unit be assumed to be nuclear and clearly defined. Opportunities for male employment in the mining sector is significant for example, in shaping how agriculture has been practiced. Land is not a purely individual asset, it is part of complex customary, legal and collective relationships, and land titling initiatives will not transform gender relations or youth access to land. Additionally, it is potentially harmful to treat all women or all youth as
equally disadvantaged, as this underpins considerable opportunity for elite capture by more advantaged and well-connected members of these groups.

Going beyond representation to inclusive transformation requires differentiation to the specifics of the local context. A more explicitly class-based analysis of inclusion is required, particularly in the context of Zambia there is increasing concern over large scale land acquisitions and increasing differentiation amongst farmers.
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