



**Political economy of inclusive agricultural intensification
Tanzania Country Report**

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November 2017

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"Agricultural intensification has been neither inevitable nor continuous in African farming systems. In some areas, intensification was halted or reversed by changing environmental or political and economic conditions; in others, it has occurred not as an adaptive response to population growth or commercialisation, but in the face of growing labour shortages and declining commercial activity. Such cases underscore the importance of studying farming as a dynamic social process. As farmers contend with social as well as environmental conditions, changes occur not only in what is produced and how much, but also in when work is done and by whom. Thus changes in cropping patterns and methods of cultivation are influenced by social factors which govern the timing as well as the amounts of labour devoted to farming, as well as the control of effort and output. Variations in the pace and/or direction of agricultural intensification are occasioned not only by exogenous events, such as war and peace, drought or flood, but also by changes in the production dynamics of particular crops" (Berry 1993: 189)

Executive Summary

This report presents a brief political economy of agriculture in Tanzania, with a specific focus on the concept of inclusive and sustainable intensification, and is undertaken as a background working paper for *Afrint IV/Papaya- Equity and Institutions in Sustainable African intensification*. The Afrint IV/Papaya project frames equity as an exploration of the experience of the identity categories of *women* and *youth*. This report does consider these groups, but we argue that to restrict an analysis of power and institutions to these groups is mistaken, given the critical dimension that a class analysis continues to play in agricultural dynamics. In this paper we do not engage with what defines 'sustainable African intensification' but rather trace the dynamics of agriculture in Tanzania in order to assess the power and politics at play in shaping agricultural outcomes.

Chapter 1 sets out an analysis of the key actors, structural dynamics and outcomes in Tanzanian agriculture from the pre-colonial to the present. It traces a discourse of modernisation that frames agricultural policy from the colonial era onwards: the imperative of transforming peasant agriculture to commercial production.

It is necessary to note that pre-colonial customary systems of land tenure and production were not automatically patriarchal, as they are sometimes characterised. Colonial policy sought to envelope and manage the pre-existing systems, and in doing so also imposed patriarchal and individualised legal frameworks imported from Europe. Hence, multiple systems of land access, allocation, and rights exist in a complex duality that continues to shape agricultural outcomes. Systems of taxation sought to embed the peasant farmer in the cash economy.

Nyerere's era of self-reliance sought collectivisation and villagization, with heavy inputs of aid and external guidance. Critically, Nyerere banned 'traditional' authorities and replaced them with a heavy formalised bureaucracy down to the sub-village level. Input subsidies and state cooperatives dominated government policy. From the 1980s, and the era of liberalisation the state role in agriculture collapsed, the narrative of modernisation continues, but now it was to be driven by the markets. In both eras, the small holder farmers continued to produce food for the growing population. The voice of civil society grows, and formal spaces for women's participation open in the governance system.

Post 2007, there is a clear and growing interest by donors in agriculture, and particularly in encouraging foreign investment, favouring large-scale outgrower schemes. Donor interventions and NGOs shape government policy, and in doing so create policies that are contradictory, and often unimplemented in practice and institutions without capacity.

Tanzania's strong economic growth of the last decade has not been driven by agriculture, but mining, construction, telecommunications, tourism and aid. A growing middle class and elite is increasingly interested in agriculture and is rapidly acquiring

land, but agriculture remains a risky and uncertain business. Inequality is growing, and this is the most critical concern for inclusion. The only universal is diversity- in some places, agriculture is growing through intensification, in others it is through extensification, in other places it is declining. Soil degradation and competition for water resources is becoming critical and acute. The discourse remains unaltered: the small farmer will be transformed and eradicated by commercialisation. How this will happen through a current policy of industrialisation (with the window dressing of 'climate-smart' agriculture) remains unclear.

Chapter 2 explores the formal and informal 'rules of the game'. A political economy analysis that only considers the policies that are described in interviews with elites, or in donor funded documents is inevitably incomplete. In Tanzania, the gap between policy on paper and implementation is vast: to the extent that policy exists as a narrative 'collective fantasy' concocted by the mutual interests of donors, civil servants and political elites. Local government and institutions charged with policy implementation are ill-equipped to do so, lacking human capacity, resources and authority. Power remains heavily centralised despite an advanced policy of decentralisation.

Where intervention does exist, then elite capture is a frequent issue, as is illustrated in the example of the input vouchers scheme. Elite capture may have a gender dimension, but requires explicit consideration of class. This also applies fundamentally to land policy, where land titling and formalisation may have actually made it easier for the poorest farmers to be dispossessed of land. A poorer man is very much more disadvantaged than a wealthier woman in this regard. The only way to address this gap is to work with the reality of current politics and institutional capacity, as suggested in a problem-driven iterative adaptation approach (See Andrew et al 2013).

Chapter 3 considers incentives and interactions in relation to agricultural dynamics in Tanzania. To a large extent, an analysis of these reinforces the conclusions of chapter 2. Policy frameworks are dominated by an aid-driven donor discourse. State investment in agriculture remains limited. Private finance is often unaffordable to the small farmer and outgrower schemes have disappointed many of those involved, and in some cases decreased food security. Elite and commercial interests are favoured in legal frameworks and in the normal business of institutions e.g. water permits can be purchased on an ability to pay basis with no assessment being made of actual water use. Small scale and farmer-led irrigation is often considered 'illegal'. Markets remain exploitative, hard to access, and unreliable for the small farmer. Exploitation and dispossession of resources are the dominant trends.

In conclusion, we assert that agriculture is getting less inclusive in Tanzania, but this inclusion is heavily class-based with complexities of age, gender and ethnicity being played out in specific contexts.

Sustainability of intensification is not a serious concern in current policy (despite lip service in donor driven policy areas)- with the emphasis continuing to be on a modernisation and commercialisation that is predominantly framed as the use of hybrid seed, inorganic fertiliser, irrigation and mechanisation. Even if policies exist,

then the lack of implementation capacity make them unlikely to have much impact in practice.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

- AARW - Action to Assist Rural Women
- AGRA - Alliance for Green Revolution in Africa
- ANSAF - Agricultural Non-State Actors Forum
- CCAP - Climate Change Agriculture and Poverty Alleviation
- CCM - *Chama cha Mapinduzi*
- DAP- Di- ammonium Phosphate
- DFID- Department for International Development
- ESRC- Economic and Social Resesarch Council
- FANRPAN - Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources Policy Analysis Network
- FHHs – Female Headed Households
- GoT- Government of Tanzania
- ILO – International Labor Organisation
- MAFC - Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security, And Cooperatives’
- MRP - Minjingu Rock Phosphate
- MVIWATA - National Network of Farmers’ Groups Tanzania
- NAIVS - National Agricultural Input Voucher Scheme
- NGOs – Non-Governmental Organisations
- PATA – Public Accountability in Tanzania
- ROSCA - Rotating Savings and Credit Associations
- SACCOs - Savings and Credit Cooperatives
- SAGCOT - Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania
- SAT - Sustainable Agriculture Tanzania
- SNV – Netherlands Development Organisation
- TAMWA – Tanzania Media Women’s Association
- TGNP - Tanzania Gender Networking Programme
- TIC - Tanzania Investment Center
- TNYDP - Tanzania National Youth Development Policy
- Tshs – Tanzanian Shillings
- UN - United Nations

UNDP – United Nations Development Programme.

URT- United Republic of Tanzania

USAID - United States Agency for International Development

VCC - Village Voucher Committees

VICOBA- Village Community Banks

About Afrint IV/Papaya

Afrint IV/Papaya – Equity and Institutions in Sustainable African Intensification is a research project funded by DFID through WYG and Greenwich University and implemented by the Department of Human Geography at Lund University in cooperation with the University of Malawi, Sokoine University of Agriculture, the University of Zambia and LUCSUS. The aim of the project is to analyze patterns of smallholder intensification in Zambia, Tanzania and Malawi from a sustainability perspective with a particular attention to: (a) gender and youth; and (b) the ways existing rural institutions could be enabled and incentivized to improve equity given prevailing policies, norms and structures. This work stream sets out to offer some answers to the following research question:

What is the role of local institutions in creating sustainable intensification? How can these roles be improved to increase equity?

Afrint IV/Papaya is an integral part of SAIRLA – Sustainable Agricultural Intensification Research and Learning in Africa. An initiative comprised of six research projects as well as national and regional learning alliances aimed at providing a forum for mutual learning and for increasing joint policy influence. For more information about Afrint IV/Papaya see <https://www.keg.lu.se/en/research/research-projects/current-research-projects/afrint/afrint-ivpapaya-0>

Introduction

Afrint IV/Papaya research focuses on the concept of sustainable intensification of agriculture. This refers mainly to increasing the intensity of agricultural production on existing land holdings, rather than the extensive cultivation of new land areas. As populations increase, this extends pressure on land holdings and therefore necessitates the intensification of production (Boserup, 1965). For this to be sustainable (Tiffen et al, 1994), and ultimately for it to play a role in agricultural transformation, then intensification also needs to be inclusive.

Inclusivity refers to incorporation of specific societal groups based on, for example, ethnicity, gender, class, age and disability and so on. For Afrint IV/Papaya, we solely consider gender (in this case referring not only to the relations between men and women, but mainly to women) and youth. Youth is defined according to the conventions adopted in each country.

Agricultural policy and agricultural support institutions can play a key role in shaping and driving how agriculture evolves and ultimately transforms. At the macro level, national governments are responsible for agricultural policy, but are influenced through dialogue and support of development partners. Therefore, development partners and governments have a responsibility for creating an enabling context of macro policy that supports inclusive agricultural intensification.

At a more meso-level, sub-national agricultural institutions and actors (including extension services, farmer organisations, traders, investors in contract farming, input suppliers and local authorities who control land tenure systems) are some of the most important mediators that determine the extent to which agricultural policies contribute to equity in ongoing intensification processes. The resources and capabilities present at the meso-level have a critical role in enabling policy and strategy to be implemented. Where resource and capability gaps are present, then the gap between stated policy and practice can be wide. At the micro level, we need to understand how policies are interpreted, implemented and how farmers experience agricultural support. We also need to understand where customary arrangements e.g. on water and land access, or social norms operate alongside more formalised institutions.

Our point of departure in this endeavor is recent interest in the extent to which and how state/party/business relationships contribute to economic transformation and poverty reduction. Many competing concepts describe relationships between elites and citizens which can lead to developmental successful (such as social contracts, social compacts, political settlements). In essence, this research agenda is a quest to understand a country's political economy. Here we use a simple definition of this contested term: for Afrint IV/Papaya, political economy analysis refers to how elite

groups in a society (based on ideology, class ethnicity, kinship, patronage or collective economic interests) compete for and use resources, rents and power. In relation to agricultural intensification, political economy analysis focuses on how productivity gains influence this competition for and use of resources, rents and power. Thus, the key issue for this stream of work is to understand whether such changes in competition between elite groups associated with agricultural intensification lead to the inclusion/exclusion of women and youth.

The incentives, opportunities and obstacles for local actors in promoting (or discouraging) equity are related to both the political economy of local development processes and a range of often conflicting national policies and programmes. Institutional change processes may lead to either inclusionary or exclusionary tendencies. National-level policies impinging on local institutions and their role in sustainable intensification include not just agricultural policies, but also climate, employment and other relevant policies. They also include issues of market regulation and support.

The political economy of inclusive agricultural intensification component of the research involves analyses of district-level praxis and national-level policies for agricultural intensification with specific attention to their implications for gender and youth.

It employs a three-lens approach looking at:

- (a) Mapping the organisational actors (who does what?)
- (b) The formal and informal rules of the game in which they operate (how are things supposed to work and how do they work in practice);
- (c) The differing incentives and interactions among actors (what are the dynamics of the actors working on agriculture?).

The political economy analysis will thus provide the basis for an informed and pragmatic dialogue with decision makers and civil society based on an in-depth understanding of who the decision makers are and what spaces exist for processes that address potential policy conflicts and channel attention to the equity implications of investments in agricultural intensification. These will be integral to Afrint IV/Papaya's engagement in SAIRLA's National Learning Alliances.

Methodology

Political economy analysis entails multiple methods of data collection, to triangulate a number of perspectives, and to map particular contexts. It aims to provide a reasoned explanation for how a current situation comes to be as it is. It therefore requires understanding of how change happened, who influenced it and what outcomes it has led to. The nature of institutions and how they shape change is particularly key to this.

This report draws on several sources of data:

1. A literature review concerning the political economy of agriculture, with a focus on the nature of institutions and evidence on the dynamics of inclusion. This review covers published academic studies, as well as grey literature.
2. Interviews with 15 national level stakeholders from within government, CSOs and donor-led initiatives. Interviewees are anonymised in this report. Some of these interviews were conducted for research on women's empowerment in agriculture funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.
3. Afrint IV/Papaya district-level Outcome Mapping workshops which obtained an overview of how extension services, farmer organisations, traders, investors in contract farming, input suppliers and local authorities who control land tenure systems are engaging with gender and youth.
4. District-level interviews with stakeholders identified through the Outcome Mapping workshops. This aspect of the research is combined with in-depth interviews with civil society actors advocating for greater equity using a Most Significant Change (MSC) method to explore how to best identify entry points for effective influence. A total of 24 interviews were conducted across three districts, with interviewees from local government, CSOs and the private sector. Interviewees remain anonymous in order to encourage openness in responses.

It is important to recognise the limitations for the timeframe for this study. The period of fieldwork at the district level was limited to seven days. This is very short for an in-depth political economy analysis. However, in this case the findings have been supplemented through triangulation with a data-set from a ESRC-DFID funded study on local governance in Tanzania, which spent considerable time mapping meso and micro-level governance (see Mdee et al 2017). Narrative and thematic analysis is used across the data sets to produce a political economy analysis as set out in the three-lens approach outlined above.

Three districts are included in this report: Kilombero; Mufindi and Kilolo.

Kilombero, the second most populous district in the Morogoro region, is known for its massive production of sugarcane and rice and has been a key target for large-scale agriculture development under SAGCOT (SAGCOT 2012; Smalley et al 2014). Farmers in the district also engage in the cultivation of maize, vegetables and rearing of livestock. Apart from the SAGCOT project, the district is a hub for major national projects such as MKURABITA, World Bank's Expanding Rice Production Project (ERPP) and 'Big Results Now'. The ERPP's main objective is to increase rice produced and marketed in the Morogoro district by providing sustainable seed systems, improving crop productivity through better irrigation and crop management, and supporting innovative marketing strategies. Dancer and Sulle (2015) report that, due to such big projects and the possibility to attract large multinational investors, the government is

looking for surplus land to be used by these investors. Based on this observation, it has been predicted that these projects might have a significant impact on access and ownership of land for the future generations especially in the rural areas.

Despite the increase in contract farming and large agricultural companies in the district, research in the past and now has revealed that most of the farmers villages prefer to stay on their own land and produce for the available market than to work under contract farming terms or as unskilled labourers for agricultural companies (Mbilinyi and Semakafu,1995; Dancer and Sulle, 2015). Private companies and the District Councils are considered as the key agents of change in equitable agriculture intensification in Kilombero. Some of the challenges identified by actors in the district in terms of their inability to integrate gender and youth include cultural beliefs, societal and household conflicts and the inequitable distribution of household income between men and women (Afrint IV/Papaya district level workshops, 2017). Institutions involved in equitable agriculture intensification includes Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Tanzania Staples Value Chain (NAFAKA) Project, Kilombero Agricultural Training and Research Institute, Kilombero Plantation Limited and the Kilombero District Council

Mufindi district is highly dependent on agricultural production and subsistence agriculture employs more than 90% of the population. Tea is known as one of the major cash crops produced in the district in addition to tobacco, sunflower, pyrethrum, beans, Irish potatoes and coffee, livestock rearing and private forestry ventures. Companies like Unilever, YARA international and Green Resources Limited are well known in the district. Despite the district's heavy dependence on agriculture, unreliable rainfall patterns have been one of the major constraints facing agriculture intensification in the district. Some agents/institutions of change identified in the district includes the East Africa Dairy Development Project (aimed at transforming the lives of over 35,000 poor livestock farmers in Tanzania), Farm Inputs Promotions (FIPS) Africa and Tanzania Farmers Association, which represent most large-scale farmers in the district.

About 32,400 ha of the total land area in Kilolo district is under cultivation and production of coffee, maize, beans, peanuts, wheat, tea, Irish potatoes, livestock rearing, and fish farming. The district has 20 improved irrigation schemes, consisting of less than 50% of the land available for irrigation in the district. A study by ANSAF (2012) revealed that these irrigation schemes are owned by a limited number of members/groups in the villages and they are mostly men. Apart from agriculture, the district hosts the only lime mine in Iringa region. The number of people employed in this sector is unknown and its contribution to the region's economy remains negligible. Almost all the cooperatives and SACCOs operating in the area are agriculture related. For instance, 7 out of the 20 cooperatives are agriculture and marketing societies, 11 are savings and credit co-operatives and 2 are for fisheries.

Actors and institutions active in the district agriculture intensification includes the Rufiji Basin Board (responsible for promoting and regulating a balance ecological and socio-economic development in agriculture along the Rufiji basin), Growing Africa's Agriculture (AGRA), Mtanga Farms (major food and meat producers in the district), One Acre Fund, USAID Mwanzo Bora and World Bank. This report consists of four further chapters which correspond to the four-lens approach outlined above, followed by a conclusion.

Chapter 1 - Structural factors of the organisational actors

This section explores the macro level structure and dynamics of change in agriculture. To understand processes of inclusion and exclusion, it is necessary to analyse the evolution of agricultural policy, practice and outcomes. Simply to focus on actors who explicitly work on the inclusion of women and youth would be mistaken. Current initiatives which emphasise the inclusion of women and youth can sometimes make blanket assumptions about how gender relations or age categories operate in society, and in our case in relation to agriculture. However, the use of these categories needs to be understood in relation to the wider dynamics of structural change.

It is very difficult to generalise patterns of agricultural evolution in Tanzania. Certainly, large scale transformation has not occurred beyond some small areas. In some areas there has been intensification, in other areas, extensification and in some areas agricultural decline. Therefore, for a political economy analysis it is important that we also examine the structures that link the macro forces to local dynamics.

The dynamics of structural change in Tanzania

There is a considerable literature on the political economy of agriculture in Tanzania, and this type of report will struggle to capture this in its entirety. To make this literature accessible, the following table outlines the significant policy and structural dynamics of agriculture from the pre-colonial to the current era. The table also charts this alongside some of the macro dynamics on the inclusion of women and youth.

The table is then referred to in the subsequent chapters detailing of the dynamics of agricultural change in Tanzania and how these dynamics interrelate with women and youth.

Table 1 - Evolution of structures and actors in agricultural intensification in Tanzania

Era	Pre-colonial	Colonial era	Ujamaa- post 1961	Structural adjustment 1985-2000	Poverty Reduction 2000-2015	Hapa Kazi tu 2015-
Agricultural Policies	None	Extensification Plantations Codification and taxation of customary lands Enforcement of patriarchal norms from UK e.g. on property ownership Modernisation of agriculture colonial extraction	Villagisation State led investment Nationalisation Agricultural subsidies State led co-operatives Modernisation of agriculture for state-building	Removal of subsidies Dismantling of parastatal and co-operatives Liberalisation-requiring agricultural modernisation for market-driven growth	Gradual freeing up of agricultural markets Greater access to inputs for those who can pay Liberalisation-stimulating agricultural modernisation for market driven growth and attracting foreign investment Land reform (land grab?) Kilimo Kwanza Big Results Now, SAGCOT	Intensification Climate smart agriculture Missing potential from irrigation Industrialisation-underpinned by agricultural transformation
Key actors	Customary arrangements Arab traders Early commercial interests	Colonial authorities Tribal authorities Commercial investors	Government Donors- esp World Bank	Government (but significantly reduced state investment) Donors Private sector and civil society growth	Government-poverty reduction strategy Donors (with increasing influence from China) Private sector (increasing influence from	Government- new industrialisation and climate change challenge Donors Private sector and civil society actors

					South Africa) and civil society growth	
Agricultural outcomes	Peasant and pastoral societies	Mainly peasant and pastoral mode with some large schemes- e.g. sisal and groundnuts	Outcomes disputed- failure of some co-operatives Disruption of peasant mode in some places Peasant mode underpins food security	Agricultural decline and soil degradation- food production keeps up with population expansion Diversification of livelihoods increasing off-farm income	Agricultural growth Urban expansion- migration Continued increase of off-farm income High growth in other sectors	No clear story Extensification in some areas Decline in some areas Intensification in some areas
Inclusion of women and youth	Women and youth embedded in customary relations (these are not uniform, unfixed or unchanging)	Imposition of patriarchal laws from UK Taxation requires increased waged work Increasing home production burden on women and youth	Critical role of women within CCM Youth league Increasing access to education	Beijing Declaration on Rights of Women 1995 Special seats and women's representation Increasing influence of NGOs working on women's rights SAPs cause decline in access to education and other public services	Increased visibility of women in education and formal employment Legal reform on ownership giving women rights to land Civil society focus on women- access to loans	Educated Youth unemployment Increased youth interest in commercial agriculture Increasing debt levels

Source: Authors own- based on Coulson (2013), Mbilinyi (2013), Caplan (1981) Mdee et al (2017)

Colonial era

A common narrative across the colonial and post-colonial eras is one of 'agricultural modernisation'. What has varied are the policy and strategic tools through which modernisation was/is to be achieved. The colonial era attempted the introduction of plantation and settler based agricultural development, but this never took off to the degree experienced in neighbouring countries such as Kenya (Leys, 1996). However, what did happen was the start of a disruption to existing customary forms of organisation and agricultural modes. What is significant for our analysis though is that land and natural resources were managed in collective and customary modes. These often embedded within them specific use rights for women, and for young people who could obtain adult status on marriage, and marriage also occurred at an early age. Colonial authorities and missionary influences tried to impose a more individualised and patriarchal approach to land acquisition and use (Mbilinyi 2013).

Ujamaa 1961-1984 – Economic Policy in the era of African Socialism

The post-colonial era saw agriculture as the route to self-sufficiency and economic transformation, and influenced by agricultural success in China, looked to state-led collectivisation and co-operative formation to drive modernisation. The policy of 'villagisation' aimed to organise peasants into villages. Between 1970 to 1976, the government adopted villagisation with the support of a number of development partners, including The World Bank (Kikula, 1997; Scott 1998; Coulson 2013). Based on this, Nyerere argued that the concentration of the rural population would lead to the modernisation of traditional agriculture through an increase in the distribution of agricultural inputs, use of mechanized equipment and increase in extension services.

"For the next few years Government will be doing all it can to enable the farmers of Tanganyika to come together in village communities ... Unless we do we shall not be able to provide ourselves with the things we need to develop our land and to raise our standard of living. We shall not be able to use tractors; we shall not be able to provide schools for our children; we shall not be able to build hospitals, or have clean drinking water, it will be quite impossible to start small village industries." (Nyerere, 1968; 184)

Under the institution of *ujamaa* villages, different types of farming systems were developed,. The block farming system, for example, according to Kikula (1997) was implemented in such a way that government and party officials could supervise what was taking place in villages. It was hoped that block and cooperative farming would promote economies of scale in production and marketing, respectively. From a critical perspective, however, block farming was seen as a means for political leaders to gain access to land, inputs and other productive resources and to capture the labour of smallholder farmers (Amanor, 2012).

The outcomes from this era remain a matter of debate (e.g. see Scott 1998, Coulson 2013). It is important to note though that processes of plantation creation and large agricultural schemes in the colonial era and villagization were partial. They did not cause sweeping structural change across agriculture. For most, agriculture production remained untransformed. However, this era did see widespread access to subsidies for agricultural inputs. The *ujamaa* era was not an era of rent seeking and elite accumulation, with the possible exception of some Asian and Greek business ventures in manufacturing and agricultural production and processing (Coulson 2013). This was an era of state led investment in manufacturing and agriculture, with intensive investment in public services. In other words, rents (defined here as super-normal profits) were often captured by the state and were invested domestically (but not necessarily productively) through an array of parastatals. Considerable amounts of aid were also received contrary to the self-reliance rhetoric of Nyerere. An increasing debt crisis ended this era, with Tanzania having overstretched its resources in attempting to stimulate the East African Community, and in the overthrow of Idi Amin in Uganda.

Ujamaa 1961-1984 – Governance in the era of African Socialism

The party of the revolution (*Chama cha Mapinduzi* - CCM) led by *Baba wa Taifa* Julius Nyerere (Father of the Nation) dominated early post-colonial state. Nyerere continues to hold a major legacy and intellectual influence in contemporary Tanzania. His vision, encompassed the creation of the nation of Tanzania (from the unification of the colonial territories of Tanganyika and Zanzibar in 1964), the embedding of KiSwahili as the national language through education, and the banning of traditional authorities. This radical vision created a largely internally peaceful society, and in comparison, to neighbouring countries, a deeply nationalist sentiment. CCM dominated the state and economy. The party introduced a system of government inherited from colonial authorities but extended party structures right down to collective groupings of 10 households (10 cells). Women and young people occupied key roles within CCM. Through state-led investment in education, opportunities for employment in the machinery of the state expanded considerably. This is not to romanticise the CCM. The CCM state was, and continues to be, capable of authoritarian action, with the clearest example being the forced villagization process imposed on villagers reluctant to move from their existing homes. When Nyerere's vision of African Socialism came under economic pressure he chose to step aside. The new political elite, tired and impatient with the constraints of socialism, had already begun to seek opportunities for personal enrichment.

Structural adjustment 1985-2000 – Economic Policy through Stabilisation and Adjustment

Wider economic forces disrupted state intervention in agriculture and the role of the state in driving agricultural transformation was substantially diminished. User fees for education and health services were introduced, agricultural subsidies were removed, contributing to rapidly increasing poverty in rural areas (see Coulson 2013). As life became less bearable for rural dwellers, rural-urban migration increased putting pressure on urban public goods and services. The rationale for this era (from around 1985) was a gradual process of market liberalisation, but still with the goal of agricultural modernisation. The state was no longer to be the driving force in agricultural transformation, but this would be driven through gradually increasing private investment and more export-led growth which, it was argued would ultimately lead to agricultural and structural economic transformation (for a detailed theoretical treatment of this transition see Mdee, Lemma & Emmott 2016). This was an era of reform and change, but also of stagnation in relation to the economy and agricultural production. Agricultural production kept pace with an expanding population but no more than that (Ponte 2002). Opportunities for elites to gain control of the means of production and rents in the economy began to happen through the slow but eventual privatisation of parastatals and the collapse of cooperatives.

Structural adjustment 1985-2000 – Governance through Stabilisation and Adjustment

Ali Hassan Mwinyi took over as President in 1985 as state slowly began to withdraw from economic activities, opening up opportunities for private investment. Whilst the retrenchment of government employees caused pain for many, CCM governance structures remained strong and intact. This era began to see an opening up space for civil society in Tanzania with a rapid increase in the numbers of local and foreign NGOs operating in the country (Shivji 2007). Many commentators see the plethora of civil society actors as essentially products of the aid landscape in the country (see Mercer 2003, Mercer & Green 2013). That said, there are influential NGOs based in Dar-es-Salaam that have played a significant role in ensuring that gender is mainstreamed across policy. For example, Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP) and Tanzania Media Women's Association (TAMWA). Particularly significant in this regard was the 1995 Beijing Declaration on the Rights of Women. Women were given special reservations in all levels of government, and the idea of women's representation in formal spaces started to become part of the national discourse. At the same time though, Mbilinyi (2013) argues that due to the changing nature of the economy and withdrawal of the state from service provision, women bore a much greater burden for household provisioning.

Poverty Reduction 2000-2015 – Economic Policy through the New Poverty Agenda

From the 2000s onwards, Tanzania starts to experience rapid economic growth, caused by a commodity boom in the global economy. Whilst Tanzania's economy has now grown rapidly for more than a decade, much of this growth relates to mining, tourism and construction. Tanzania also continued to receive considerable inflows of aid, and it is within these sectors that the major rent seeking opportunities occur, particularly in the nexus of government and commercial interests. Agricultural growth has never matched the pace of growth in the wider economy, and this is one of the key reasons why Tanzania is perceived to have performed poorly in relation to poverty reduction. Moreover, the rents from agriculture have not matched those available in other sectors. The population of Tanzania has also increased rapidly and agricultural production has continued to keep pace with this (Coulson 2013). Agricultural policy remains rooted in a vision of modernisation and commercialisation, but this remains significantly at odds with the reality that agriculture remains small-scale. Current policy has greater space once more for the state, and commercial agricultural investment is supported and encouraged, particularly through the provision of finance. Irrigation, in particular, is viewed as having considerable latent potential to transform agriculture (see Harrison & Mdee 2017). The encouragement of government of private and foreign investment, and the reform of land law has enabled a land grab to occur in parts of Tanzania. Rent-seeking in all sectors of the economy has become a more dominant feature of elite accumulation in Tanzania in this period, and inequality is rising.

Poverty Reduction 2000-2015 – Governance through the New Poverty Agenda

There are some who argue that Tanzania has made the transition from socialist 'basket case' to thriving neo-liberal state committed to good governance and open democracy. Indeed, the period 1995-2005 (President Mkapa) and 2005-2015 (President Kikwete) see Tanzania's status as a good governance performer in relation to the international agenda (Edwards 2012). Considerable policy reform in conjunction with development partners has taken place in this period, Tanzania's new openness to foreign investment, particularly with the rise of China, has paid economic dividends in terms of economic growth. However, throughout this period, CCM remains the dominant force in Tanzanian politics despite the introduction of multi-party elections in 1995. The system of governance remains largely embedded and synonymous with the historical structures of the ruling party, although now with some pockets of opposition representation.

Figure 1 below outlines the structure of governance and decision-making in Tanzania. There are three key points for the purposes of this study. First, the extent of decentralisation in Tanzania. Responsibility for planning is in theory driven from the

bottom-up and resources then should flow down the system to support local plans. Second, that the system has multiple routes for power, influence and resources to flow. Civil society and religious institutions do play significant localised roles, but the political party structure of CCM (e.g. Regional and District Commissioners) also remains intact.




Figure 1: The structure of Tanzanian governance- from macro-micro level

Source: Mdee et al (2017:10)

Third, much implementation responsibility is pushed down to the village level, yet policy design remains locked at the macro level. Mkapa and Kikwete presided over government machinery adept at producing policy documents to please donors, but lacked the strategic vision or the capacity to be implemented in practice (see Wild et al., 2015, for a further treatment of this). That is why the gap between policy design and implementation remains large, and the intended aims of policy (whether poverty reduction or agricultural transformation) have tended to remain elusive.

Post 2015- Economic policy and governance

Whilst it is too early to assess the new era in Tanzanian politics, there are indications that the election of President Magufuli (The Bulldozer) in late 2015 has shifted some aspects of the Tanzania's political economy. Whilst a continuation of CCM's dominant position, Magufuli presides over a government that is accumulating debt, and a youthful population that is becoming frustrated and rebellious at a lack of opportunities. The approach to agriculture remains largely unchanged, the narrative of modernisation remains, but with a renewed emphasis on irrigation as both a tool of transformation. Climate change mitigation and adaptation has also entered the policy discussion but with scattered implementation driven by fragmented donor interests. Seen as a populist, Magufuli is challenging wasteful public expenditure and corruption, and is rolling out fee-free access to secondary school. At the same time, freedom of speech is threatened and there is increasing control of the media. He has also recently banned pregnant school girls from returning to education⁴.

So how inclusive has the evolution of agriculture in Tanzania been? Analyses of gender and agriculture suggest that the colonial era introduced and embedded patriarchal structures of ownership and power, especially around land (see Mbilinyi 2013 and Caplan, 1981). However, within the post-colonial bureaucracy there has been a gradual transformation in relation to gender. Women played key roles in the anti-colonial struggles, and since 1995 with the UN Beijing Convention on the Rights of Women, there have been gradual moves to open up the political space for women in relation to representation. Rights of ownership to property and assets have also been reformed.

The position of youth is much less clear. In Tanzania youth extends to the age of 35, and in some senses the category is rather artificial, as youth can also mean anyone who has not yet established a livelihood or married. In some senses, the current

⁴ <https://af.reuters.com/article/africaTech/idAFKBN19E1CF-OZATP>

generation of youth have far greater access to education than any previous generation in Tanzania. However, many lack access to resources with which to build livelihoods.

Agriculture is not done by individuals operating in isolation. Women and youth who do agricultural work do so through social relations, and it is these social relations which influence the extent to which they can benefit from agriculture. Women continue to dominate the production of food for the home. Where agriculture also is for external production, the outcomes are very variable depending on the extent to which decision-making and allocation of resources is shared. Again, this is very variable, and we should not assume that women are routinely excluded (see the data in Anderson et al 2016 on the extent of shared decision-making). Patriarchal norms must not be assumed or generalised, there is considerable variability in these and customary practices are not automatically discriminatory against women. Women in Tanzania do have reservations for representation at all levels of government. This is not to claim that there is no gender-based discrimination, but that this should not be excessively generalised.

Overall, agricultural evolution continues to be dominated by a narrative of modernisation and commercialisation that is at odds with the reality of small-scale agricultural production. To this extent, agricultural transformation has not been inclusive to the small-scale farmer and to only look at youth or women obfuscates wider structural issues. The system of governance is (in theory) decentralised and characterised by bottom-up planning processes. In practice, limited resources flow from the top downwards and local government has little capacity to take action. Governance remains highly tied into the system of local government, and is linked closely to the structures of the ruling party. There is often a large gap between policy at the macro-level and implementation capacity at the micro-level.

The space for civil society has increased in Tanzania. However, civil society is dominated by religious institutions. Agricultural NGOs do exist, but appear to fit the mode of NGOs dependent on relationships with donors, rather than a genuine expression of large scale collective organisation- see Table 2 for an overview of the most significant local NGOs working on Agriculture.

This section provides an overview of the structural dynamics in agriculture in Tanzania. It services to highlight a number of significant issues:

- That a consistent policy narrative on the modernisation of agriculture in Tanzania has persisted through different economic and governance eras.
- However, significant problems in implementation capacity have led to a policy-implementation gap.
- The structuring of inclusion also changes over time, and it is vital to understand how groups such as 'women' and 'youth' are differentiated, and are impacted

by a range of structural factors that change over time. Their experience cannot be generalised.

Table 2 - Examples of CSOs involved in agricultural transformation in Tanzania

<p>Agricultural Non-State Actors Forum (ANSAF-TANZANIA)</p> <p>Member-led forum</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Umbrella body of -organizations and individuals from the commercial sector, non-governmental (both Tanzanian and international) and from farmer groups in Tanzania. They work with private companies like Katani Ltd, Raleigh Tanzania as the only International Organisation, about 15 Local groups and 10 umbrella networks 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthening the Tanzania's Seed and input markets • Ensuring Livestock Development in Tanzania by providing livestock policy strategies for the GoT • Ensuring GoT commitment to the Maputo Declaration • Advocating for effective regulations for the cashew nut industry in Tanzania • Advocacy for gender sensitive policies in agriculture • Promoting accountability by analysing government spending and budgeting in projects like the Agricultural Sector Development Programme especially at the District Level
<p>National Network of Farmers' Groups Tanzania (MVIWATA)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Farmers membership union (100,000 farmers with membership cards) Ongoing conflict between what should be the main priorities of the organisation in aiding farmers and various groups benefiting MVIWATA. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MVIWATA approaches agricultural productivity in Tanzania through a bottom up approach. According to MVIWATA promotes the adoption of conservation agriculture in for example the Morogoro Region and irrigated agriculture and agroforestry in Dodoma Region.
<p>Agriculture Council of Tanzania</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ACT is the umbrella organisation of the agriculture private sector in Tanzania. Function is to dialogue between stakeholders and agricultural associations to ensure a highly productive and commercialized agriculture in Tanzania. • Can play a critical role: the GoT's "effort in land grabbing in Bagamoyo". According to the Chairman of the Council, "the council does not support any international NGOs that according to him 'want to turn the nation into a hostage and food importer.' 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ACT has been known to be the key private player in Kilimo Kwanza since 2009 and subsequently coordinated SAGCOT. ACT lobbies for increase in government expenditure in agriculture by for example, lobby for the commencement of an incentive package once again in the agriculture sector, reduce taxes and improve general agribusiness policy environment. Worked with government to establish the Tanzania Agricultural Development Bank (TADB)

Source: Authors own- compiled through interviews and organisational documentary review

Chapter 2 - The formal and informal rules of the game

This section explores systems of agricultural support operating at national and district levels. In doing so it is necessary to identify formal policies and processes as they are stated, and also how they are implemented in practice. *In many cases there is a significant gap between systems in theory and operation in practice.* In addition, agricultural change is also mediated by informal institutions, such as customary ownership of land or social norms relating to women and youth. It is very important that social norms are not understood as fixed, uniform and unchanging. The key point for this section is that there may be multiple routes for individuals to navigate the creation of agricultural livelihoods. This section does not take the fully historical perspective of the previous section. Instead, for the formal rules of the game, we select some current policy instruments in order to examine the current context. Hence, *we set out the intentions of a policy and review evidence of what happens in practice.* This emphasises the policy-practice gap. We then turn to the informal rules of the game through a discussion of governance and accountability at the interface of the national and district levels.

Kilimo Kwanza (Agriculture First)

Kikwete's *Agriculture First* resolves to accelerate agricultural transformation through modernization and commercialization. Formulated by the Tanzania National Business Council and heavily influenced by donor interests, *Kilimo Kwanza* uses a Private-Public Partnership (PPP) approach and is seen as having the potential to 'accelerate economic development and eradicate poverty' in Tanzania' (see Shamte, 2010; Ngaiza, 2012).

The Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) Programme is an international PPP initiative under *Kilimo Kwanza* aimed at improving investment in agriculture and promoting inclusive commercialization for smallholder farmers and farming communities. It aims to ensure inclusiveness by highlighting small, medium and large- scale farmers into modern and commercial agriculture. Moreover, the SAGCOT Investment Project (SIP) (a distinct aspect of SAGCOT which works in conjunction with the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty/Mkukuta II) aims to benefit half a million people, engage up to 40 agribusiness operators, with an emphasis on including women in successful commercial value chains (World Bank 2017). Yet, it's planning frameworks are silent on how to achieve gender inclusiveness or safeguard women from externalities generated from commercialization and the enclosure of land and water resources (Gallagher, 2016).

Kilimo Kwanza (Agriculture First) in Practice

Some scholars argue if this goal is achievable, one situation that can be foreseen in this investment program is a lack of transparency on land deals, a lack of transparent data about investors/investments and varying complexities surrounding land-based investments (Sulle,2016), especially land grabbing and the displacement of minority and vulnerable groups (Mousseau and Sosnoff 2011). It is unclear if SAGCOT has been able to improve gender inclusion. So far this appears absent and has been difficult to measure especially at its early stages (Gallagher, 2016). Sulle (2016) comments on the uncertainties pertaining to how this PPP under SAGCOT can promote inclusion, especially of small-scale producers. He argues that 39% of the companies that expressed interest in investing in Africa's agriculture are large companies like Unilever and Yara International. This raises the prospect of large-scale outgrower schemes and forms of contract farming (see Prowse 2012, Oya 2012, Barrett 2012 and Ton et al 2017 for recent overviews). ng

Land demarcations under SAGCOT (which is underway in Mbeya, Kilombero and Iringa) are targeting areas where government large-scale agricultural initiatives are already being implemented. Sulle (2016) argues that apart from areas where civil society organizations are formalizing similar projects, this will favour large scale investments, creating space for local elites and multinational companies to accumulate land and prosper at the expense of vulnerable groups and small producers, including women-headed households.

NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL INPUT VOUCHER SCHEME (NAIVS)

The National Agricultural Input Voucher Scheme (NAIVS), implemented by the Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security, And Cooperatives' (MAFC), aimed to provide farmers with a subsidy of 50% towards the purchase of chemical fertilizers and improved seed varieties for maize and rice. Thus, farmer beneficiaries have been expected to boost food production by gaining access to critical agricultural inputs, with the aim of reducing pressure on the price of food staples, increasing farm incomes and boost the nation's food security (Padian et al 2014). By 2011/2012, the program was reported to have reached over 1.5 million beneficiaries. NAIVS included subsidies for (1) Basal phosphate fertilizer (Di- ammonium Phosphate, DAP or Minjingu Rock Phosphate, MRP),(2) urea top dressing, and (3) improved maize (hybrid or OPV) or paddy seed intended for one acre of land.

The distribution of packages to beneficiaries is done through Village Voucher Committees (VCC) which are supposed to be comprised of 3 women and 3 men at the village level. By adopting such a decentralized process, it is assumed that local leaders are more accountable to local constituencies and can use prior knowledge about beneficiaries to follow targeting guidelines. Beneficiaries are selected by VCC based

on ability to co-finance, literacy, cropping pattern, gender of household head, and past input use (Pan and Christiaensen,2012). Specifically, the farm household must:

1) cultivate more than 1 hectare of maize or rice, (2) be able to afford the subsidized cost of the input package (also known as the "top- up" amount), (3) Priority should be given to female- - headed farming households, (4) Priority should be given to farming households that have not used improved inputs in the previous 5 years.

After 3 years, NAIVS assumes that beneficiary farmers have been able to increase their incomes and therefore will be able to fully purchase and continue to use high-quality agriculture inputs without the aid of subsidies. NAIVS is said to have significantly improved average yields for maize and rice for all beneficiaries (World Bank, 2014). On the other hand, others argue that such positive figures are overstated and that the vouchers have been used politically (Cooksey,2012). We explore this further below.

NAIVS – Evidence in Practice

NAIVS has been criticized for its over-ambitious, multiple and conflicting objectives and ambiguous targeting criteria (Pan and Christiaensen, 2012). Whilst the vouchers are intended to boost output and increase poor smallholder farmers' incomes (Wiggins and Brooks, 2010), there appears to be some tension in the selection criteria. For example, VVCs are looking for FHHs who will be able to afford the 50% top-up amount yet cultivate less than 1 ha of land. However, women cultivating less than 1 ha of land have the tendency to not be able to afford 50% of the cost of the input. The tension between these criteria have limited the program from reaching a higher percentage of targeted beneficiaries. As revealed by a World Bank study in the Morogoro and Kilimanjaro regions, being literate, wealthy, and having larger area of land increases the likelihood of being a beneficiary (Padian et al, 2014). However, the program in these regions were found to promote gender equity by including women in VVCs who ensured FHHs were selected to be beneficiaries. On the other hand, the program was not identified to have significantly improved women's decision-making power in their households (Padian et al, 2014). It is unknown if youth are selected to be beneficiaries but it is assumed once any person (regardless of age) meets the requirements, the individual is selected to participate in the program.

Pan and Christiaensen (2012) reveal that the distribution of subsidies were dominated with elite capture with almost 60% of the village officials and VVC members receiving approximately 60% of the distributed vouchers in Kilimanjaro region. Moreover, in villages with unequal land distributions and villages far away from town, a higher percentage of vouchers were distributed to local elites. The above trend is likely to increase as VVCs continue to complain about poor remuneration received for their

services, according to Padian et al (2014). Extension service officers also played a major role in promoting inequality in voucher distribution. They were found to 'disproportionately steer vouchers away from new input users or households with higher marginal productivity in fertilizer use' (Pan and Christiaensen, 2012).

TANZANIA NATIONAL YOUTH DEVELOPMENT POLICY (TNYDP)

The Tanzanian National Youth Development Policy (2007) is the national document that informs national and stakeholder strategies for supporting the youth for socio-economic development. Since Independence, the country has published two National Youth Development Policies: in 1996 and in 2007. Temporary, agricultural and informal employment remain the main focus of GoT in addressing unemployment among the youth. These include:

- Sectoral interventions in agricultural and industrial policies to ensure that growth is employment intensive
- Improved agricultural production, development of agro-industries, support to small and medium-scale enterprises, and expanded labour-intensive manufacturing
- Conducting research to integrate traditional farming system and modern methods
- Encouraging the formation of youth development groups, Savings and Credit Cooperative Societies (TNYDP,2007)

Rural-urban migration remains a major constraint on the participation of youth in agricultural development in Tanzania. According to the national youth policy, youth migrate to urban areas due to poor infrastructures, inadequate social services and limited opportunities. To reduce this occurrence, government hopes to 'collaborate with private sector to create a conducive environment for youth to settle in rural areas' (TNYDP,2007) by improving rural conditions.

TNYDP – Evidence in Practice

The 2007 TNYDP policy is absent on specific, tangible and implementable mechanisms as to how the foci outlined above can be achieved. It places considerable emphasis on collaboration with other stakeholders, especially the private sector. Stakeholders like Sustainable Agriculture Tanzania(SAT) has been working with youth in agriculture by providing week-long courses to equip them with sustainable agricultural practices and entrepreneurship. Studies have proven that younger farmers are more likely to participate in agricultural field school (Davis, 2010).

There is very little evidence of systematic action by government in this area, and in common with many national policies there is a hope that the private sector will come and fill in the gap. One intervention that is implemented is the 5% local government loan fund for youth groups. The funds available and barriers to accessing them remain considerable. We explore this further in the next chapter when looking at incentives.

Land ownership and land policy in Tanzania

Land ownership in Tanzania has gone through three different phases. The pre-colonial phase where land ownership was based on customary laws of different ethnic groups and land title was derived from traditions and customs of the respective group. In this phase, land was communally owned by family, clan or group. Chiefs had powers over land administration and they were trusted by the community. The colonial phase where land was declared as public land whether occupied or unoccupied and land rights were vested through the control of Governor for use in common benefit of the native population. Lastly the post-independence phase where a series of laws were formulated to set out framework of land and natural resource governance through state authorities. It should be noted that any authority vested in Chiefs was made illegal through the African Chiefs Act of 1969 (Coulson 2013).

In 1995 the Tanzania National Land Policy was formulated in which the fundamental principles for land use and management were set out and enacted in Land Act No. 4 and Village Land Act No. 5. Since then there have been number of amendments which has led to the creation of two new land acts which are the Land Act of 1999 and the Village Land Act 1999 which came into force in 2001. Through these amendments, land in Tanzania is vested in the office of President on behalf of all citizens and the land is divided into three categories which are general land, village land and reserved land. Under the Land Act the right of occupancy is between 33 years to 99 years. Village land governed by Village Land Act recognises the rights of villages to common pool resources held collectively by village residents under customary law. The village land includes communal land and land that has been own by individuals. The Land Act state clearly that a non-Tanzanian citizen has no right to own land but foreigners through the Tanzania Investment Act can be allocated land designated for investment after they have met all requirements. Additionally, foreigners can look for desirable land owned by Tanzanian nationals and agree on the acquisition of such land with the owner who submits the existing title need to the Ministry of Land where it can be re-issued as land designated for investment purpose through Tanzania Investment Center (TIC) where they can obtain the rights issued to investors.

The Village Land Act seeks to empower the customary right of occupancy titles, in order to stimulate development for majority of households who hold very small farms

throughout the country. Customary land rights are given priority in legal recognition which means increased land security for landholders. Additionally, the act provides an opportunity to the land owner to register land. Registered land provides an enabling environment for village land to be used as collateral. It has the potential to increase equality in land ownership between men and women. The recent decentralisation process has aimed to provide a more effective and efficient way for land dispute resolution.

There is a tension here between, on the one hand, decentralization objectives and, on the other hand, new legislation which maintains centralised state-control. This is clearly seen in the process around title deeds when it comes to mortgaging or new loans: the title has to be checked centrally in the Ministry of Land. Also, not all financial institutions (banks) accept customary land titles. Furthermore, the legislation states that women have the right to acquire, hold, use and deal with land and that they are subject to the same restrictions as men. Village Councils are not allowed to adopt any contrary discriminatory practices or attitudes towards women, when they apply customary right of occupancy. This applies to loans, leases, assignment or mortgages and their representation in any public bodies related to land matters is assured through direct elections or affirmative action.

Land ownership – Evidence in Practice

Some literature indicates that there has been an improvement in land ownership in relation to women but in practice this is debateable (Stein et al 2016). There is a growing perception among men that women are given priority in registration and even in obtaining credit in banks. Supporters argue that regulations are mainly needed to protect poor sections of the rural population from being brutally exploited by financially strong potential buyers (Yefred, 2005). There are also many situations where women and men use the land jointly without any consideration of who own the land title or the value of the land. The majority of agriculture is conducted collectively and not by individuals (Bomuhangi et al 2011; Doss et al 2014, 2015). Use rights to land are often more significant than titled ownership, and some argue that titled ownership can even make it easier for the poorest to lose land (Tsikata, 2016). In addition, adding a woman's name to a title deed does not overcome issues of asset control within the household as the system still enables men to use their spouse's names to register land, but in practice their spouse may have no means to claim a right of ownership or use of that land.

There is the view that discrimination against very poor families regarding customary land rights remains. Farmers with very small landholdings are also very unlikely to be able to use their land as collateral through formal title (Stein et al, 2016) A study completed by the Gender Land Task Force (a civil society coalition) (Kempster 2011)

revealed that compared to men, women have formalized control over less land because the whole process of formalizing land rights requires money. Other gender practitioners argue that the root cause of the gender imbalance is cultural norms (differences in ideologies and practices) and religion beliefs.

Women's rights to land through inheritance are commonly indirect, insecure and inferior to those of men. However, this is not always the case and in Mara region and in the Ulugurus in Morogoro there is matrilineal inheritance and women do have power to own land. One of the biggest issues in relation to land is legal duality, whereby there is a mix of institutional approaches to land ownership and use. Customary inheritance norms exist alongside new bureaucratic land ownership procedures, and to claim land rights require capacity and resources (Dancer 2015). In these circumstances, different actors may choose different routes in order to attempt to resolve land use disputes.

Governance and accountability -National and District Level

The findings of this research in relation to the relationships between different layers of government in Tanzania are entirely corroborated by those of the 3-year ESRC-DFID funded study on local governance in Tanzania (see Mdee et al 2017). The overall finding of that study is that the government of Tanzania remains highly hierarchical and centralised in practice, in stark contrast to a policy rhetoric of decentralisation and participation. This has allowed central government to blame actors downstream in the system for a lack of transformation. Therefore, better services are not delivered because of the failings of local service providers, but rather a failure of government to provide resources and institutions that are required for transformation.

This research finds both literature and fieldwork-based evidence to support the above. For instance an MVIWATA interviewee reported that a partnership project conducted by ActionAid and MVIWATA⁵ through the Climate Change Agriculture and Poverty Alleviation (CCAP) in Kilosa and Chamwino districts in Tanzania revealed that districts lack sufficient funding, that information about expenditure and budgeting were treated as confidential and the few resources received from the central government are mainly targeted at running district council meetings rather than delivering services. Most poor farmers complain that they receive little support from government.

Who benefits from district and local government depends on personal relationships, political affiliation and whose decisions one supports. According to the Public Accountability in Tanzania Initiative (SNV, 2013), the quest to instigate change at the local level is constrained by a culture of informal incentives and personal relationships. Such informal systems are bound to affect any developmental agenda at the district

⁵ <http://www.mviwata.org/the-climate-change-agriculture-and-poverty-alleviation-ccap/>

level. PATA reports that some CSOs have been faced with situations where there is the need to operate between funders requirements and the politics and realities at the local level. Thus, to be able to effect change at the local level, a critical focus should be centred on strong, committed and influential actors who are motivated and inspired to drive positive change in their localities and districts. In worst cases, these identified interlocutors at the local level find it difficult to implement and push forward new standards in the face of patron-client relations.

Evidence from our district research confirms the top-down and political nature of policy implementation. District councils believe themselves to be an implementation agency, responsible for implementing all central government policies at the district, division and ward level. Officials at the district level commented that, their duty is to 'receive instructions from the top levels'. For example, the agriculture department's duty is also to provide loans and good farming environment for farmers, by providing seeds, fertilizers, tractors and power-tillers. In the course of their duties, officials stated that:

"In all activities that we do we ensure that the gender issues has been considered- because women are more sensitive in responding- when you train one, it is like you have trained the whole community." (Local NGO interview at Mfundi)

Accountability at the district level means monitoring and evaluation of activities at the local level. Feedback from village authorities is channelled through the local government officers at the village and ward level. Representatives at the village level are also responsible for writing monthly reports, however these reports are reported to the next higher level, rather than to the village or community. Accountability tends to flow up the system, with the expectation that citizens need to be 'sensitised' on how they should be delivering development. Whilst there are civil society led attempts to introduce a more citizen- based demand-led approach to local and central government accountability, this does not chime with the reality that local government has very little capacity to deliver or to implement policy.⁶ District councils stated that one of the major constraints they face in achieving their targeted goals is the existence of political interference:

"politicians sometimes hinder us to perform our work at our best e.g. the Ward Council Councillors usually want us to select groups based on their interest" (District Level Interview)

This illustrates the confusion within the system and a tension between elected representatives and local government employees. The district council's main identified means of change in their districts is their ability to formulate and implement bye- laws.

⁶ For further details on accountability and blame in the system see Mdee et al (2017)

Whilst district councils believe the government formulate good agricultural policies, the district lacks the capacity and funding to be able to implement such policies. For some districts, district officials explained that approved budgets are often not fully disbursed (see Ampaire et al 2016). Turning to gender, Ampaire et al (2016) also notice that the amount of money allocated towards gender sensitive programs in agriculture has decreased drastically over the years. More than 50% of agricultural policies have a gender mainstreaming imperative but lack implementation due to a lack of funds. According to district councils, the government stipulates that 5% each of the district budget should be allocated to providing loans for women and youth empowerment in the district. Youth and women groups can access these loans through formulated and registered groups under the Department of Community Development. These loans are supposed to be paid back within a specified period. Depending on the number of group members a group can get up to 2,500 USD.

However, the scale and impact of these allocations is doubtful. All district council revenues must first be lodged with the Bank of Tanzania and then must be requested. The process of application requires formal group formation and the production of a business plan.⁷ During fieldwork, it was very difficult to quantify the number of loans that had been made. The indications are that very few loans have been issued. For example, in Iringa in 2012, there were 107 women's economic groups with a total membership of 666 women, who benefited from the loans provided from the district's 5% budget allocation towards women empowerment. Each group received on average 804,000 Tshs (\$506 at the 2012 exchange rate). The most active ward according to the district council is the Itunundu Ward, with over 18 different women economic groups and a total membership of 94. Only 11 out of the 25 wards have youth economic groups that benefited from the 5% district budget allocation towards youth empowerment. In theory, the youth groups can receive up to 6.5 million Tshs (\$4000 at the 2012 exchange rate) from Iringa District Council (the Nduli Ward youth empowerment groups are known to be the most active). The lack of collateral is identified as one of the challenges preventing the youth from being part of empowerment groups.

This section demonstrates the considerable gap between the formal rules of the game (policy as stated on paper) and the informal rules of the game (how things actually happen). The reasons for this policy-implementation gap are numerous and do not relate only to agriculture. However, it does flag up a considerable challenge for driving processes of change. Efforts targeted at only the formal rules, that ignore the

⁷ This is aside from the question of whether such groups business are actually viable

informal, will continue to contributing to the problem. Therefore a politically informed approach is necessary for navigating this gap.

Chapter 3 - Incentives and interactions

In this section we consider the dynamics and interactions between actors in agricultural support. We analyse the broad context, and then focus on the incentives and interactions in relation to the explicit inclusion of women and youth. We consider the power dynamics between actors, and where significant change appears to be most effectively driven. This section focuses on analysis at the district level. This also consider the role of agricultural markets are particularly key to change in the sector. In addition, public investment can be significant. For instance, the presence of feeder roads, or irrigation infrastructure can be critical to driving agricultural transformation. The nature of markets and public infrastructure can also have influence on the dynamics of inclusion. For example, do women and youth get access to public investment infrastructure such as irrigation schemes? Do traders offer preferential rates to men?

Despite the focus on agriculture as the driver of structural economic transformation there remains a largely negative perception of agriculture as a livelihood strategy. However, there is recognition that there is a renewed focus on agricultural support but that this is constrained by people's lack of knowledge. The critical role played by women in agriculture, alongside the low interest of youth is widely recognised:

"The gender equity issue is very wide but what I can say is that the participation of youth is low compared to women. By nature women are the main farmers in this country-the low participation of youth may be because they are more educated and they don't see the benefit of farming" (Kilombero district interview)

"Another reason is because youth do not have land the cost for renting land for farming make it even more difficult" (Kilombero district interview)

"Men talk more and do less- also men have more INCOME GENERATING IDEAS but the main implementers are women" (Mufindi district interview)

There are some areas, notably in Kilombero, large pieces of land have become available to young people with money. In areas like Madibila, most farmers are relative young and are graduate farmers. Here, large-scale rice farming takes place through sourcing irrigation water mainly from the Ruaha River. The provision of infrastructure is key to such processes of intensification.

Government and finance institutions

Collateral arrangements as stated earlier remains a major constraint for youth interested in investing in agriculture especially in the rural areas. Though realized as an agriculture economy, research by FANRPAN (2012) revealed that most Tanzanian banking institutions are reluctant in providing financing for agriculture (considered as a risky business). For one to be considered for loans, with about 14% interest rate, applicants require detailed business plans, collaterals like Land Titles and focus on large scale farm projects with the scale of not less than 50 hectares of farm land. This excludes small holder farmers from such opportunities. In reference to lands, research has revealed that as commercial interest in farming heightens in Tanzania, fathers are less willing to provide land to their children, promoting intergenerational conflict (Le Meur and Odgaard, 2006; Jayne et al., 2014).

This is also confirmed by District level informants:

"for those who have houses and lands, they are able to assess credits. Those who don't own houses and lands, the huge challenge is collateral in accessing credits. But also the youth are not settled for what they want to do. the youth are adventuring and are not settled in one place. they might say they need money for boda-boda but the next day they are nowhere to be seen" District CSO interview

The district council 5% youth empowerment fund/loan exist for youth and gender development in the various districts and wards, however, District Councils raised huge concern over repayment.

"having youth related friendly credits and group lending can also help. so, when you pay your first installment then you can increase the credits. so, we increase credit based on the trust that you build with them. If they borrow in groups they will become more accountable to each other and ensure quick repayment"- District level interview

Youth involved in agri-business in addition to technical skills, needs to be trained on soft skills such as efficient business management skills, so they can be able to repay loans. Respondents at all scales suggested that, capacity building, awareness creation, youth-friendly credits facilities, and encouraging group lending can help solve the issue of non-payment of loans. On a more general scale, most people take these loans for non-intended activities. This has been identified as a major constraint leading to non- repayment.

"We get issues of forgery on economic activities that they are doing- e.g. one group claimed that they are buying and selling rice but when we visited the store we found out it wasn't theirs"- District level interview

"Funding of non-intended activities-most of the people change their minds and invest on different activities soon after getting the money-some even use the money to buy clothes"- District level interview

Women's economic groups are certainly more numerous than youth groups. However, similar concerns were also expressed as to issues of repaying loans. As we saw in chapter 2, the number of women's groups receiving funds through the District Council loans is not great in comparison with the wider population, and so claims as to the significance of this funds should not be overstated. District Councils were also unable to share up to date data on this.

Public Investment in infrastructure

The Government of Tanzania has a stated commitment to investing in infrastructure as part of a new strategy towards industrialisation. Much emphasis has been put on road building, but Tanzania is a vast country and the road network remains highly constrained. Education is now free of fees at primary and secondary level, but is constrained by very poor outcomes. There are extended efforts to enable access to health services through the Community Health Fund, but at the present time enrolment is limited. Access to health and education services is particularly critical to inclusive agricultural transformation. For example, women need access to sexual and reproductive health services in order to reduce their burden of childcare and domestic labour.

In relation directly to agriculture, there is a recognition of the importance of irrigation infrastructure in driving the transformation of agriculture, and in increasing resilience to climate, but there is limited government funding for this- instead the strategy is reliant on attracting private investors. For example in 2015, the National Irrigation Commission received only 9% of its agreed budget (See Mdee and Harrison – forthcoming). As agriculture expands there is increasing pressure on water resources. Current water and irrigation policy is currently beyond the implementation capacity of the water institutions tasked with the management of it, leading to a system of water resources being available to those who can pay for extraction (Mdee 2017). This has potentially catastrophic long-term implications for agricultural productivity, as some river basins are already experiencing over-extraction, whilst demand for water resources increases and rainfall in some areas decreases. The state currently does not have an effective governance framework to deal with this, and the current system of decentralisation exacerbates the problem.

District level interviews consistently argue that more investment in agricultural infrastructure is needed to drive agricultural transformation, but that the Districts do not have the resources to do this. This relates not only to irrigation infrastructure but also to warehouses for storage.

"There is a critical lack of sufficient storage facilities-More warehouse should be built by private and government investors"- Kilombero

Donor Funded Projects

There is a current wave of donor funding in agriculture development in Tanzania. According to CSOs, donor funding plays a huge part in agriculture development, nutrition and gender empowerment in the various districts, however, donor policies are changing. According to respondents, there is now, for instance the 50/50 co-financing policy where the community involved are supposed to contribute 50% to the project implementation. Mufindi districts according to the interviews have benefited from World Bank, UN, USAID and JICA funds in the past, but now observe that these are dwindling. It is observed that proposals towards capacity building proves to be a good way to get funds.

The donor's role, according to interviews do not usually entail deciding for farmers what they need to grow but rather support and strengthening institutional frameworks and supporting farmers through education, extensions and provision of better seeds and fertilizer.

"Donor contribution is now dwindling because of global issues in the North, affecting aids flowing into Africa in general". CSO Interview

There are narratives of conflicts of interests. For example, district level interview revealed that usually private or donor organization goals do conflict with district councils objectives for agriculture. For instance, the plans of the donor may not fit the plan drawn up by the District Council, however, the District Council is lacking in funds to implement its plans.

"In Mufindi district, some of the donors/organizations determine what to be grown- they provide farmers with specific seeds and fertilizers- sometimes they advise on buying farmers product when they harvest. These organisations are mostly interested in business and not the welfare of the farmers. Sometimes when donors try to influence the council to do something that is out of their priorities, DC office provide them with direction on what to be done and how it should be done, failure to comply may results into dismissal of the project.

"Insufficient funds for implementation of existing plans- a biggest funder for the Irrigation schemes in Kilolo is JICA but most of the time he wants all his funds to be directed towards infrastructure and therefore there is little funds directed towards allowance for staff"-

Councils may be dependent on donor resources in order to take action, and so they have an incentive to follow the plans of donors, even when those plans do not reflect the priorities of the District.

Incentives for Civil Society Actors

Civil society actors are also largely reliant on donor funds for their activities. When funds are present they can take action, but often on a very small scale. For some civil society actors involved in agriculture intensification, the question is what happens after donor-funded projects end.

For the Community Grassroots Initiative Association for example, the organization was formed as a local technical team to sustain the services that were previously provided by a donor. They stated that, agriculture intensification and inclusion projects remain unsustainable because projects failed to improve human and local capacity to sustain services.

"our NGO which is a local NGO was formerly an international NGO. when the project phased out, we as the local technical team found ways and means to sustain our services. these donors funded are encouraged to establish local structures but sustaining them is the problem. there is a shifting demand for human capacity once the project phased out. thus, there is the need to sustain local structures and empowering them". CSO interview

There have been a number of women empowerment initiatives across the various districts. For example, International Labor Organisation initiated called Action to Assist Rural Women(AARW) which lasted for 5 years (1990-1995). The AARW established a forum which was focused on capacity building, leadership, entrepreneurship, credit, agricultural livestock etc. in addition to the women entrepreneurship fund/loan from the district. Women formed economic groups, registered with their own constitutions and registration done at the district level. Women who are organized, access funds after responding to an advert from the local government. Participants also made mention of the regional survival fund towards business development fund developing rural and urban programs that were aimed at empowering women through the business development skills.

"We acted as facilitators in all these projects. We also realized some women were getting involved in timber production. See, women are being empowered and thus they are getting involved in these hectic businesses". CSO interview

Village Community Banks (VICOBA) reportedly allow some women to access working capital and assess credit to invest in various economic activities. VICOBA operate by providing loans to the poor and are intended to support income generating activities

that are carefully selected based on market opportunities, appropriate technology and locally available resources. Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCA) also presents key incentives for women to participate and to be empowered in their daily economic activities. For example;

"the tushikamane group where they implemented a block farming for women to participate as counsellors. if you empower them, they have the capacity to participate effectively. For us, when they earn money, where do they invest more. Women invest in the education of their children in Mfundi district, they are known to empower women through community development program to empower women to invest in their enterprises. so, women invest in home appliances, expanding their farms but most of them are investing in food security crops". – Mufindi CSO view

Civil Society groups also claim to facilitate women economic groups to access the women's economic fund from the Ministry of Community Development-a fund set aside by government to support women and provide credit to women. Some interviewees suggested that these groups can be positive for the women involved not only in relation to economic capacity, but also in political participation.

"so, you find that women are empowered to get into forest development by growing Teak. there are women who have been empowered and they are making money from forestry. so, you know there are women who are aspiring to be leaders like councilors." District Level Interview

Agricultural Markets

With reference back to chapter 1 of this report, attempts to transform the nature of agricultural production in Tanzania have been central to the state building project throughout Tanzania's existence. Since the late 1980s with the collapse of many parastatals and marketing cooperatives, agricultural markets were freed up internally to stimulate production and trade. This was limited in the early part of this reform period, but starts to gather pace in the mid-2000s as the wider economy begins to grow. With rapid urbanisation and population increase, the demand for food steadily increases and agricultural production keeps pace. The government does control imports of food crops through regulation and tariff but there is considerable volume of illegal importation (Coulson 2013).

Contract farming is encouraged in Tanzania, and incentives are place for investors to establish outgrower schemes. e.g. Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT). Considerable donor resource has gone into such initiatives, but the long term impact is uncertain.

The extent to which such schemes offer inclusive transformation at the local level is debateable. Sulle and Dancer (2015) note that outgrower schemes in Kilombero have increased household income but reduced food security. Others contend that government legislation forcing outgrowers to join Farmers' Association has led to exploitation and capital accumulation by local elites also in Kilombero (Isager et al 2016).

Certainly, the interviews for this research suggest that there are problems with agricultural markets for small farmers.

There is no concrete policy for agricultural market development at the local level in Tanzania. Although some specific crops may receive support through donor or government initiatives. However, according to District level interviews this demotivates farmers from producing on a large scale because there is a danger that they fail to sell their crops after harvesting. Interviews revealed that in all the districts, there have been initiatives to promote agribusiness, however the Tanzanian business environment does not yet effectively support start-ups and SMEs. Most especially, the youth are discouraged from engaging in marketing opportunities because of the heavy taxation systems and export regulations

"when you decide to establish your own company, you are thinking of heavy taxation so most people hate to establish business company just because of taxing system in Tanzania. it is not favoring agricultural business." District level interview

"a lot of youth and women restrains from farming because they don't benefit from it despite so much effort they put in it". District level interview

In Kilolo district for example, tomato farmers experienced massive post -harvest loss due to lack of markets and inability to export. District level interviewees argued that there should be changes to be made in Tanzanian marketing and export policies for agriculture products especially in price regulations. -

"Youth and gender empowerment initiatives are most of the time not successful- some efforts can be made to ensure that there is full participation of youth in agriculture but soon after harvest, marketing becomes an issue and demoralize all the effort that has been taken"- District Level interview

"Another challenge is marketing-for example there is a rice from Pakistan sold in our market at 800 while our rice is up to 1500 simply because of higher production cost here in Tanzania than Pakistan- Also the lack of value chain due to selling of unprocessed rice"- District Level interview

“A better marketing and pricing policy should be introduced and implemented to safeguard farmers from loss caused by marked fluctuations- also the policy on burning export of food crops should be revised” – District level interview

The situation of where farmers have increased production, but fail to translate this into profits is not isolated to this fieldwork. Research on the Dakawa Rice Farm shows a doubling of production did not lead to an increase in profits for farmers- as whilst their costs increased, the market price for rice decreased (See Mdee et al (2014) and work by Therkildsen 2013 on how illegal importation of rice via Zanzibar is suppressing the price of locally produced rice.

The current government has banned the export of food products currently⁸, but it is unclear whether it has sufficient grip on illegal importation, or indeed whether it has the political will to control it

It is significant to note from District level interviews that there is disappointment with contract farming with large scale agri-businesses. Concerns also exist in the literature (see Dancer and Sulle 2015). The overall concern is that private companies don't honour the promises that they make to farmers, and therefore cause farmers to lose trust. However, it was also reported that there have been some successful private companies that are planting some maize with farmers.

“Private companies might have gained the trust of farmers and thus being able to determine what farmers should grow, but others have failed most farmers”.

“there was a time a certain company convinced the farmers to grow beans and they will provide them with market but they never did- this had led into tension between the farmers, donors and the council”

This chapter provides an overview of current incentives and interactions. Some gaps in the incentives to drive agricultural transformation are clear: with respect to investment in agricultural infrastructure, the returns to farmers from engagement with commercial agricultural and the performance of agricultural markets. These gaps then weaken the outcome performance of initiatives aimed at supporting inclusive growth in agriculture.

⁸ <https://www.kenyans.co.ke/news/20478-tanzania-bans-export-food-grains-including-maize-kenya-and-other-neighbours-impound-40> This article states that food grains could not be imported- however interviews with farmers suggests that buyers for all agricultural products are being prevented from entering the country.

Conclusion

This analysis of the political economy of agriculture in Tanzania offers no easy answers to inclusive agricultural transformation. The quest to transform agriculture in Tanzania has a long history. The Government in conjunction with donors has consistently developed agricultural policies and initiatives aimed at the commercialisation of small scale agriculture. However, the fundamental problem is that they remain disconnected from the realities of small scale agriculture. Despite mainstreaming inclusive language in relation to youth and women in policy, the scale of activities being undertaken on this front are hardly transformational.

It is also debateable whether this approach to inclusion (primarily the reservation of spaces in committees and targeting of loans) is effective in transforming agriculture. It can be argued that women and youth will benefit from a strategic effort to transform small scale agriculture as a whole, through state-led investment, that addresses elite capture of resources, land, markets and incentives. Neither women nor youth are a unified category of persons with the same needs and interests. Committee and political reservations for women are likely to benefit elite and well-connected women who have far greater power than poor men (see Mdee 2008, or Tsikata 2016)

It is recommended that the Afrint IV/Papaya project considers the following critical issues:

Working with the policy-practice gap

There is a significant gap between stated agricultural policy and actual practice on the ground. Some evidence of Government-led initiatives is visible in fieldwork, but the scale is often limited.

Despite a rhetorical commitment to decentralisation, it is central government that holds the power to act on these issues, as local level actors have little power or resource to do so. Incentives for actors are uneven and largely relate to incoming projects- related to donors funding and therefore operating on limited timescales. Public investment in infrastructure is patchy and often reliant on attracting donor and private funds. It is also common for projects to have capture of resources by local elites, and therefore a limited impact on more marginalised farmers.

Despite policy commitment to a transformational role for private actors. This research finds that private sectors contract farming is not mentioned as significant by respondents. Farmers and Districts report disillusionment and exploitation with these initiatives. Contract farming may also be driving new processes of elite capital accumulation in the areas where this is practiced.

Benefits from increased agricultural production are not guaranteed.

Even if agricultural production intensifies and increases, this may not create greater profitability in agriculture, or food security in agriculture. This research confirms other published literature suggesting that increased production of commercial crops such as sugar cane can increase local level food security. More intensive production methods may increase costs, debt and reduce profitability. Further that, initiatives that facilitate increased production can fail to produce benefits for participants, as a result of wider market problems.

Additionally, agricultural initiatives aimed at increasing production through irrigation, overstate the potential increases and insufficiently recognise the dangers of over-extraction of water resources.

Making agricultural intensification more inclusive is more than policy statements, women's groups and land titling.

There is no uniform gendered or youth experience, and policy statements on inclusion are vague and have little meaning in implementation. Women are seen as critical to agriculture, but the position of youth is more ambiguous. However- there are some educated urban youth who see agriculture as an investment opportunity- they have capital to invest

Agriculture remains largely the business of the family unit, and inclusion initiatives must take this into account. Neither should the family unit be assumed to be nuclear and clearly defined. Land is not a purely individual asset, it is part of complex customary, legal and collective relationships, and land titling initiatives will not transform gender relations or youth access to land. Additionally, it is potentially harmful to treat all women or all youth as equally disadvantaged, as this underpins considerable opportunity for elite capture by more advantaged and well-connected members of these groups.

Going beyond representation to inclusive transformation requires differentiation to the specifics of the local context.

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